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MISDEMEANORS BY THE NUMBERS 
SANDRA G. MAYSON* 
MEGAN T. STEVENSON** 
Abstract: Recent scholarship has underlined the importance of criminal misde-
meanor law enforcement, including the impact of public-order policing on commu-
nities of color, the collateral consequences of misdemeanor arrest or conviction, 
and the use of misdemeanor prosecution to raise municipal revenue. Despite the 
fact that misdemeanors represent more than three-quarters of all criminal cases 
filed annually in the United States, however, our knowledge of misdemeanor case 
processing is based mostly on anecdote and extremely localized research. This Ar-
ticle represents the most substantial empirical analysis of misdemeanor case pro-
cessing to date. Using multiple court-record datasets covering several million cases 
across eight diverse jurisdictions, we present a detailed documentation of misde-
meanor case processing from the date of filing through adjudication and sentenc-
ing. The resulting portrait reveals a system that disproportionately impacts poor 
people and people of color. Between 2011 and 2016, each jurisdiction studied re-
lied on monetary bail, which resulted in high rates of pretrial detention, even at rel-
atively low amounts, and imposed court costs upon conviction. There were sub-
stantial racial disparities in case-filing rates across locales and offense categories. 
The data also, however, highlight profound jurisdictional heterogeneity in how 
misdemeanors are defined and prosecuted. The variation suggests that misdemean-
or adjudication systems may have fundamentally different characters, and may 
serve different functions, from place to place. It thus presents a major challenge to 
describe and theorize the contemporary landscape of misdemeanor justice. At the 
most fundamental level, the variation calls into question the coherence of the very 
concept of a misdemeanor and its role in the criminal justice system. As apprecia-
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tion for the significance of low-level law enforcement builds, we urge scholars and 
policymakers to attend carefully to the complexity of this sub-felony world. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 12, 2018, two black men were arrested for sitting in a Philadel-
phia Starbucks.1 The charge: trespassing.2 The men were waiting to meet a 
friend, and when they declined to make a purchase or leave, the manager 
called the police to have them removed. Had the two men actually committed 
criminal trespass? Maybe; the relevant statute leaves room for argument.3 The 
more important question is whether waiting for a friend in a Starbucks is wor-
thy of arrest, and whether it would have resulted in arrest had the men been 
white. 
When a video of the incident was posted to the internet, the response was 
swift and dramatic. The video was viewed almost ten million times in three 
days.4 Protesters descended on the Starbucks store. Starbucks CEO Kevin 
Johnson traveled to Philadelphia to offer a face-to-face apology to the two 
men, and on May 29, Starbucks closed 8,000 stores for the afternoon so that 
employees could attend racial-bias training.5 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Matt Stevens, Starbucks C.E.O. Apologizes After Arrests of 2 Black Men, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/15/us/starbucks-philadelphia-black-men-arrest.html [https://
perma.cc/M867-RQAG]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 The law provides that “[a] person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or 
privileged to do so, he . . . remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by: (i) 
actual communication to the actor . . . .” 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503(b)(1)(i) (West 
2019). On the one hand, the men remained in the Starbucks after the manager ordered them to leave, 
and presumably knew that the Starbucks was private property. On the other hand, the men might have 
reasonably believed they had the right to remain because Starbucks holds itself out as a gathering 
place open to the public. Moreover, Pennsylvania law provides a defense to trespass if “the premises 
were at the time open to members of the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions 
imposed on access to or remaining in the premises.” Id. § 3503(c)(2). 
 4 The video, posted to Twitter by a bystander, had over nine million views after three days on the 
internet. See M.L. Nestel, Handcuffing of 2 Black Men in Starbucks in Philadelphia Called ‘Repre-
hensible Outcome’ by CEO, ABC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/News/black-men-
walked-starbucks-cuffs-trespassing/story?id=54470047 [https://perma.cc/6JYB-WDZL]; see also 
Melissa “That White Lady” DePino (@missydepino), TWITTER (Apr. 12, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://
twitter.com/missydepino/status/984539713016094721?lang=en [https://perma.cc/2DR3-LSZS]. 
 5 Bill Chappell, Starbucks Closes More Than 8,000 Stores Today for Racial Bias Training, NPR 
(May 29, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/29/615119351/starbucks-closes-
more-than-8-000-stores-today-for-racial-bias-training [https://perma.cc/ZKM6-4EHW]; Prudy Gour-
guechon, The Psychology of Apology: How Did Starbucks’ CEO Kevin Johnson Do?, FORBES (May 
6, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/prudygourguechon/2018/05/06/the-psychology-of-apology-
how-did-starbucks-ceo-kevin-johnson-do/#1325ea88ac8d [https://perma.cc/WWN5-DHZ2]. 
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The Starbucks saga illustrates a major shift. After decades of neglect,6 
misdemeanors have entered mainstream criminal-justice debates. By defini-
tion, misdemeanors are low-level crimes, many of which have only an attenu-
ated relationship to public safety.7 Compared to felonies, misdemeanor penal-
ties are light: fines, fees, probation, and/or short jail terms.8 There is, however, 
growing awareness that the consequences of misdemeanor arrest or conviction 
are far from trivial.9 Money bail keeps those who cannot afford to post it de-
tained for days, weeks, or months before their case is resolved.10 Fines and 
fees imposed for a misdemeanor conviction can be a massive burden for the 
poor.11 Probation is intrusive, and failure to comply with all conditions of pro-
bation can land a person back in jail. Even short jail sentences can be highly 
destabilizing; a few days in jail can lead a person to lose her job, housing, or 
custody of her children.12 Beyond the criminal justice system, a misdemeanor 
arrest or conviction may trigger a host of collateral consequences, including 
deportation, barriers to employment, and ineligibility for some public bene-
fits.13 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Misdemeanors have historically received little attention from criminal justice scholars, activists, 
or the media. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2012) 
[hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2012] (suggesting that misdemeanor convictions should receive 
more attention and due process than they are presently given). There are notable exceptions where 
scholars have delved into misdemeanors and their consequences. See generally, e.g., MALCOLM M. 
FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 
(1992); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy 
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992). 
 7 See Misdemeanor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining misdemeanor as a 
“crime that is less serious than a felony”). 
 8 See id. (listing the potential punishments stemming from a misdemeanor conviction). 
 9 See, e.g., Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2012, supra note 6, at 1315 (noting that although misde-
meanor defendants “are largely ignored by the criminal literature and policymakers, they are neverthe-
less punished, stigmatized, and burdened by their convictions in many of the same ways as their felo-
ny counterparts”); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the 
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 277 (2011) (explaining that misdemeanor con-
victions have repercussions beyond the court-imposed punishment). 
 10 See Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/W99E-69Z2] (reporting on the collateral effects 
stemming from indigent defendants’ inability to post bail). 
 11 See Jessica Brand, How Fines and Fees Criminalize Poverty: Explained, THE APPEAL (July 16, 
2018), https://theappeal.org/fines-and-fees-explained-bf4e05d188bf/ [https://perma.cc/ZDT9-CBCA] 
(detailing the long-term consequences of court-ordered fines and fees given to low-income individuals). 
 12 See Roberts, supra note 9, at 287–89 (discussing the ramifications of jail time regarding hous-
ing and employment opportunities); Eli Hager & Anna Flagg, How Incarcerated Parents Are Losing 
Their Children Forever, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2018/12/03/how-incarcerated-parents-are-losing-their-children-forever [https://perma.cc/4MH8-NG42] 
(reporting on the difficulty incarcerated parents face in keeping custody of their children). 
 13 See Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2012, supra note 6, at 1316–17 (describing collateral conse-
quences that misdemeanor convictions can trigger); Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor Sys-
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The cumulative impact of these consequences is profound, because the 
misdemeanor system is vast. There are approximately thirteen million misde-
meanor cases filed each year, representing more than three-quarters of all crim-
inal cases.14 The extraordinary case volume, informality, and perceived low 
stakes of misdemeanor proceedings also make the system particularly suscep-
tible to certain kinds of distortion. Amorphous public-order offenses allow for 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.15 Even well-intentioned policing 
that targets poor neighborhoods disproportionately funnels the poor into mis-
demeanor court, where the routine imposition of fines and fees compounds the 
disparate burden. Because misdemeanor pretrial detainees can often plead 
guilty to go home, pretrial detention influences case outcomes and undermines 
confidence in the accuracy of the adjudicative system.16 
The new wave of attention to misdemeanor justice has exposed and ex-
plored these pathologies.17 The Department of Justice raised the profile of 
                                                                                                                           
tem, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2013) (noting that misdemeanor convictions “can affect 
future employment, housing, and many other basic facets of daily life”). 
 14 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 47 (2010), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/
CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx [https://perma.cc/J4ME-7YXH]; Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G. 
Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 737 (2018). 
 15 Cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (affirming that Chicago’s gang-
loitering ordinance violated due process because it did not provide “sufficiently specific limits on the 
enforcement discretion of the police ‘to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity’”) 
(quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 64 (Ill. 1997)). 
 16 See generally Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future 
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 202 
(2018) (noting that the high rate of poor and minority pretrial detainees calls into question the effec-
tiveness of the criminal bail scheme); Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misde-
meanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 711 (2017) (arguing that because detained defend-
ants are more likely to plead guilty than defendants who can afford bond, the bail system undermines 
the fairness of the criminal legal system); Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of 
Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. ECON. 
529, 529 (2017) (arguing that being detained directly “increases the probability of conviction”); Me-
gan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 511, 511 (2018) (studying the causal connection between pretrial detention and case 
disposition); Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 
22 (Colum. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 531, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2774453 [https://
perma.cc/G6WF-XTSK] (noting that “[m]any defendants who are detained on money bail before trial 
choose to plead guilty in exchange for release”). 
 17 See generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SO-
CIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (offering a view of the court sys-
tem that handles misdemeanor cases); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW 
OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNE-
QUAL (2018) [hereinafter NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME] (analyzing the misdemeanor 
system and its impact on people in the U.S.); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in ACADEMY FOR 
JUSTICE, A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 73 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) 
(explaining the various problems with the misdemeanor system in the U.S.); Erica Hashimoto, The 
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misdemeanor policy with its reports on policing and low-level case processing 
in Ferguson and Baltimore.18 Impact litigation groups have begun to find suc-
cess litigating constitutional challenges to pretrial detention and fines-and-fees 
regimes.19 Increasing media coverage has brought the realities of troubled mis-
demeanor practice to a newly engaged public. 
Yet despite the growing interest, there is little empirical data available 
about the misdemeanor criminal justice system.20 Criminal justice data are no-
toriously bad, but in the hierarchy of suboptimal data infrastructure, misde-
meanor systems fall at the bottom.21 Accordingly, empirical research on mis-
demeanors has focused on a few isolated jurisdictions. New York City makes 
detailed misdemeanor data publicly available, which has allowed both gov-
ernment agencies and independent researchers to illuminate misdemeanor case 
                                                                                                                           
Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1019–21 (2013) (dis-
cussing the “profound problem” of underrepresentation for misdemeanor defendants); Eisha Jain, 
Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810 (2015) (discussing the need to reform the misde-
meanor system); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 611, 645–53 (2014) [hereinafter Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice] (analyzing the effects 
of prosecutorial discretion in misdemeanor case-handling); Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and 
Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043, 1074 (2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Aggregation] 
(suggesting that the goals of the criminal justice system have steered away from justice); Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 256–65 (2015) [hereinafter Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors 2015] (cataloging recent scholarship on misdemeanors); Natapoff, Misdemeanors 
2012, supra note 6, at 1313–14 (discussing the various problems with the misdemeanor system); Rob-
erts, supra note 13, at 1099 (expressing the need “to have more defendants choose trial over a guilty 
plea, or at least reject a quick, early guilty-plea”); Roberts, supra note 9 (offering a critique of legal 
advocacy on behalf of misdemeanor defendants). 
 18 See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 163 (2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download [https://perma.
cc/R5R3-KJ3T]; CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 102 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M5W-AMG2]. 
 19 See, e.g., Criminalization of Poverty, S. CENTER FOR HUM. RTS., https://www.schr.org/our-
work/criminilization-of-poverty [https://perma.cc/K77A-3EK4]; Ending American Money Bail, 
EQUAL JUST. UNDER L., https://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/money-bail-1/ [https://perma.cc/4ZX5-
57ZC] (describing Equal Justice Under Law’s litigation campaign challenging various courts’ bail or 
bond systems); Our Work, CIV. RTS. CORPS, https://www.civilrightscorps.org/work [https://perma.cc/
XB8B-8624]. 
 20 See Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 265 (diagnosing “an enormous need—and 
enormous opportunity—for empirical studies of the petty offense system”). 
 21 At the top end, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Bureau of Justice Statistics, and a range of 
other federal agencies maintain enviable data about federal case processing, including nationwide data 
about felony case processing. See, e.g., Publications & Products: Felony Defendants in Large Urban 
Counties, BUREAU JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=27 
[https://perma.cc/2UBM-QGRN]. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) keeps national data on 
reported crime and estimated arrests, but does not categorize its data by felony or misdemeanor of-
fenses. See 2015 Crimes in the United States, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/home [https://perma.cc/VH54-FQC7]. 
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processing there.22 A handful of studies have analyzed particular facets of mis-
demeanor court records elsewhere.23 The new non-profit Measures for Justice 
is collecting court data nationwide and, as of this writing, has published nine 
misdemeanor-specific statistics that apply to between one and six states each.24 
A new misdemeanor research network sponsored by the Misdemeanor Justice 
Project is producing a series of statistical reports on misdemeanor arrests in 
selected cities.25 Exciting and important though they are, these efforts only 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See generally, e.g., MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, PRETRIAL DETEN-
TION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART I: NONFELONY CASES (2007); NYC DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION, AN 
ANALYSIS OF QUALITY-OF-LIFE SUMMONSES, QUALITY-OF-LIFE MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS, AND FELO-
NY CRIME IN NEW YORK CITY, 2010–2015 (2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oignypd/downloads/
pdf/Quality-of-Life-Report-2010-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6BT-SCE3]; Kohler-Hausmann, Manage-
rial Justice, supra note 17, at 611; Data Collaborative for Justice, JOHN JAY COLL., http://misdemeanor
justice.org [https://perma.cc/2ENR-XFUX] (providing a series of reports developed on the basis of New 
York City misdemeanor data). 
 23 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND 
WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 14–19 (2011), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/eb3f
8d52-d844-487c-bbf2-5090f5ca4be3/three-minute-justice-haste-and-waste-in-florida-s-misdemeanor-
courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ3A-D6RA] (researching various aspects of misdemeanor cases in Florida); 
GERALD R. WHEELER ET AL., PROJECT ORANGE JUMPSUIT: THE MISDEMEANOR REPORT #1, at 1–9 
(2016), http://themisresearch.org/files/MISD_2016_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2X8-5ZV4] (re-
porting on pretrial and case outcomes in Harris County, Texas); Heaton et al., supra note 16 (reporting a 
quantitative study of misdemeanor bail and pretrial detention in Harris County, Texas); Stevenson, supra 
note 16 (including an analysis of misdemeanor bail data in Philadelphia). 
 24 See MEASURES FOR JUSTICE, https://measuresforjustice.org [https://perma.cc/9DJJ-WSUA] 
(last updated Mar. 13, 2020). The statistics (“measures”) are (1) percent of cases filed that are misde-
meanor cases (in PA, 2009–2013), (2) percent of nonviolent misdemeanors initiated by citation (in 
FL, 2009–2013), (3) percent of cases with nonmonetary pretrial release that involved only nonviolent 
misdemeanor charges and defendants with no in-state conviction in the past three years (in PA and 
WI, 2012–2013), (4) percent of cases with monetary bail that involved only nonviolent misdemeanor 
charges and defendants with no in-state conviction in the past three years (in PA and WI, 2012–2013), 
(5) percentage of nonviolent misdemeanor cases that were diverted in which the defendant had no in-
state conviction in the past three years (in PA and WI, 2012–2013), (6) percent of misdemeanor cases 
resolved within ninety days (in AZ, FL, NC, PA, UT, and WI, 2009–2013), (7) median time to dispo-
sition for misdemeanors (in AZ, FL, NC, PA, UT, and WI, 2009–2013), (8) percent of nonviolent 
misdemeanor convictions with defendants who had no in-state conviction in the past three years where 
sentence is jail (in FL, PA, and WI, 2012–2013), and (9) median jail sentence length for nonviolent 
misdemeanor convictions where defendant had no in-state conviction in the past three years (in FL, 
PA, and WI, 2012–2013).  
 25 See generally JACQUELINE B. HELFGOTT ET AL., SEATTLE UNIV., TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR 
ARRESTS, REFERRALS, & CHARGES IN SEATTLE (2018), https://datacollaborativeforjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Trends_in_Misdemeanors_Seattle.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW2H-CPAD]; 
MEGHAN KOZLOWSKI-SERRA ET AL., UNIV. MD., TRACKING ENFORCEMENT RATES IN PRINCE 
GEORGE’S COUNTY, MD 2006–2018: A REPORT OF THE RESEARCH NETWORK ON MISDEMEANOR 
JUSTICE (2019), https://datacollaborativeforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/RNMJ-Prince-
Georges-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4FQ-3LBA]; MEREDITH PATTEN ET AL., JOHN JAY COLL. OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS IN NEW YORK, 1980 TO 2017 (2018), http://
misdemeanorjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK48-57W4]; 
BRIAN P. SCHAEFER ET AL., JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRACKING ENFORCEMENT 
RATES IN LOUISVILLE, 2009–2016 (2018), https://datacollaborativeforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/
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represent a start. Considering that misdemeanor cases constitute the bulk of the 
criminal justice system, we still know very little about how misdemeanor sys-
tems around the country actually operate.26 
In recent work, we undertook to synthesize the best available national da-
ta on misdemeanor arrests and case-filing rates in order to estimate the total 
scale of the system as well as to chart high-level trends.27 We found that, con-
trary to common perceptions, the misdemeanor system is shrinking. This does 
not mean that the problems related to misdemeanor case volume are any less 
serious than they appear, but rather that they are not new.28 We found marked 
racial disparities in misdemeanor arrest rates, although the degree of disparity 
varied considerably by offense.29 Several trends were strikingly consistent 
across the data. The ranking of offense types by degree of racial disparity has 
remained largely constant for the last thirty-seven years, and the arrest rate has 
been dropping for decades for almost every offense category and in almost 
every state for which data were available.30 These patterns suggest some de-
gree of uniformity in the structure of misdemeanor systems. 
Having sketched the big-picture outlines of misdemeanor justice, our goal 
in this Article is to zoom-in on the details. We aim to paint a basic empirical 
portrait of misdemeanor case processing across a range of diverse jurisdictions. 
                                                                                                                           
2018/04/Tracking-Enforcement-Rates-in-Lousville-2009-to-2016_Misdemeanor-Justice...1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4G6M-QE3K]; LEE ANN SLOCUM ET AL., UNIV. MISS., TRACKING ENFORCEMENT RATES 
IN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, 2002–2017 (2018), http://misdemeanorjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/10/Tracking-Enforcement-Rates-in-St.-Louis_2002_2017.pdf?mod=article_inline [https://perma.
cc/Q5ZW-ACWP]; LORRAINE C. TAYLOR ET AL., N.C. CENT. UNIV., MISDEMEANOR ARREST 
TRENDS IN THE CITY OF DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA 2007–2016 (2019), https://datacollaborativefor
justice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Durham-Misdemeanor-Trends-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VJC9-GVRC]. 
 26 Since we began work on this project, Alexandra Natapoff released her masterly book on mis-
demeanors, a book that includes an estimate of the total number of misdemeanor cases filed in 2015. 
The John Jay Research Network on Misdemeanor Justice has facilitated the six reports on misde-
meanor arrests, and the Prison Policy Institute of California has released a report documenting arrest 
trends in California from 1980 to 2016, including for misdemeanors. See NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT 
WITHOUT CRIME, supra note 17, at 2 (reporting that 80% of the criminal proceedings in the United 
States are for misdemeanors); MAGNUS LOFSTROM ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., NEW IN-
SIGHTS INTO CALIFORNIA ARRESTS: TRENDS, DISPARITIES, AND COUNTY DIFFERENCES 3–4 (2018), 
https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/new-insights-into-california-arrests-trends-disparities-and-
county-differences.pdf [https://perma.cc/93SX-7BJQ]; supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 27 See generally Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 14 (providing a national study of misdemeanor 
arrests and cases filed in the United States). 
 28 See id. at 764–69 (discussing this point). 
 29 Id. at 769–71. This phrasing is a simplification; rather than “misdemeanor arrest rates,” we 
reported arrest rates for “likely-misdemeanor” offense categories because there are no national arrest 
data available for misdemeanors specifically. Id. at 743–44. In order to obtain a rough approximation, 
we extrapolated from FBI arrest data for offense categories that we judged likely to contain mostly 
misdemeanors. Id. at 742–44. 
 30 Id. at 771. 
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We have chosen eight, for reasons both practical and analytical: Philadelphia 
County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia); Cook County, Illinois (Chicago); Harris 
County, Texas (Houston); Bexar County, Texas (San Antonio); Jefferson Coun-
ty, Kentucky (Louisville); rural Kentucky (a combined group of all Kentucky 
counties with a population density below 250 people per square mile);31 Fair-
fax County, Virginia (Fairfax); and rural Virginia (a combined group of all Vir-
ginia counties with a population density below 250 people per square mile).32 
For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the single counties by the name of 
the major city each contains. Using detailed data drawn from court records, we 
present both overview statistics for each jurisdiction and a more focused analy-
sis of pretrial bond practice and sentencing. Because each jurisdiction has dif-
ferent institutional arrangements for classifying and adjudicating misdemean-
ors, the study focuses on cases handled in each jurisdiction’s “main” misde-
meanor courts. 
Our data confirm prior claims about the scale of the misdemeanor system 
as well as the disproportionate burdens on poor people and people of color. We 
estimate that 40.4 misdemeanor cases are filed annually per 1,000 people; if 
our jurisdictions are representative of nationwide practice this would imply 
that more than 13 million misdemeanor cases are filed each year in the United 
States.33 The weight of this gargantuan apparatus falls heavily on the poor and 
on people of color. During the years we studied, every jurisdiction used money 
bail as a determinant of pretrial release for at least some defendants. Frequent-
ly, the imposition of money bail resulted in pretrial detention, even at the low-
est amounts. In the median jurisdiction for which this data was available, 43% 
of defendants with bail set at $500 were detained pretrial. All jurisdictions im-
posed court costs upon conviction. Racial disparities, meanwhile, were perva-
sive. In every jurisdiction we studied, black people were overrepresented 
among those charged with misdemeanors relative to population demographics, 
and white people were underrepresented. Racial disparities in case-filing rates 
were starkest in the Chicago area, where the case-filing rate for public-order 
                                                                                                                           
 31 We calculated population density on the basis of each county’s land area as reported by the 
U.S. Census Bureau in 2010, and its population as reported by the Census Bureau for 2013. Popula-
tion, Housing Units, Area, and Density: 2010—United States—County by State; and for Puerto Rico, 
AM. FACTFINDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/
productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [https://perma.cc/C3ZF-8Q8Y]; Population Estimates by Age, Sex, 
Race, and Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-kits/
2018/estimates-characteristics.html# [https://perma.cc/F72H-T4JP]. “Rural Kentucky” includes 110 
counties. 
 32 See supra note 31. “Rural Virginia” includes eighty-five counties. 
 33 This aligns with our prior national estimate. See Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 14, at 737, 
745. It also accords with scholar Alexandra Natapoff’s recent estimate. See NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT 
WITHOUT CRIME, supra note 17, at 251 (estimating the “total size of the 2015 US misdemeanor dock-
et” at 13,240,034 criminal filings).  
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and drug offenses was more than eleven times greater for black people than for 
white. 
The data illuminate other points of cross-jurisdictional commonality as 
well. Nearly all convictions in almost every locale were resolved by guilty 
plea; trials were vanishingly rare.34 Four offense types—driving under the in-
fluence (DUI), simple assault, petty theft, and possession of marijuana—
constituted the majority of cases in most jurisdictions.35 Public-order offenses 
also constituted a meaningful proportion of cases. Consistent with the national 
data, in all jurisdictions the total case-filing rate declined significantly during 
the period of our analysis. 
Yet the variation across jurisdictions was even more profound. Jurisdic-
tions differ in the very behaviors they classify as misdemeanors as well as in 
their institutional structures for adjudicating the many different kinds of cases 
that constitute the sub-felony world (including misdemeanors, ordinance viola-
tions, traffic infractions, and civil offenses). Misdemeanor case-filing rates 
ranged by a factor of three across our research sites. There was considerable 
heterogeneity in practices at every stage of the proceedings. One notable het-
erogeneity is the variation in how different jurisdictions treat non-DUI traffic 
offenses. This variation pertains both to the extent to which traffic offenses are 
classified as misdemeanor offenses, and to whether they were processed in the 
central misdemeanor court or in a special traffic court. To ensure at least some 
level of comparability across jurisdictions, we drop traffic offenses from most 
of our analyses. Finally, although the presence of racial disparity in case-filing 
rates was universal, the degree of disparity varied widely. What the data reveal, 
in other words, are misdemeanor court systems that may be broadly shaped in 
common by exogenous forces, but that differ dramatically in the specifics of 
their implementation. 
This heterogeneity suggests some degree of dissensus, or at least the lack 
of a consensus, about what behaviors warrant treatment as criminal misde-
meanors, and what such treatment should entail. We cannot say how the heter-
ogeneity in this data compares to felony case processing, but we suspect it is 
more extreme. Regardless, the variation suggests that misdemeanor adjudica-
tion systems may have fundamentally different characters, and serve different 
functions, from place to place. It thus presents a major challenge to efforts to 
describe and theorize the contemporary landscape of misdemeanor justice. 
A central theme of recent misdemeanor scholarship, for instance, is the 
argument that contemporary misdemeanor enforcement practices serve less to 
adjudicate guilt and punishment for specific bad acts than to regulate aggregate 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Philadelphia is the exception. See infra Appendix A. 
 35 They are not the majority in Virginia, but still constitute more than 40% of cases. 
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populations—in particular, people of color, the indigent, and those perceived to 
have a propensity for disorderly or criminal behavior.36 This regulatory project 
is facilitated, scholars suggest, by trivial and amorphous public-order offenses 
that allow police and prosecutors vast discretion to selectively enforce the 
law.37 The objective of the criminal process, on this view, is not to sort the in-
nocent from the guilty and ensure just punishment for each violation (what Issa 
Kohler-Hausmann terms the “adjudicative model”).38 Instead, the objective is 
social control: “to sort and regulate people over time” through repeated con-
tacts with the system and records that document those contacts (the “manageri-
al model”).39 
Some of the patterns we document align with the managerial model. The 
high case volume and almost complete absence of trials suggest a preference 
for efficient disposition over accurate determinations of guilt. The racial dis-
parities in case-filing rates and heavy reliance on monetary bail and penalties 
are consistent with the thesis that misdemeanor justice disproportionately tar-
gets people of color and the poor.40 The low conviction rates in most places 
conform to a model that prizes documented contact with the system over pun-
ishment for specific acts, as do the high rates of diversion and deferred adjudi-
cation. 
Other patterns offer more qualified support for the regulatory perspective. 
Three of the four most commonly prosecuted offenses in every jurisdiction—
                                                                                                                           
 36 See, e.g., Jain, supra note 17, at 815 (arguing that arrests function “as a regulatory tool—a 
means of monitoring, ordering, and tracking individuals,” a function at odds with “criminal law con-
cerns” like “adjudicating guilt or innocence, maintaining law and order, deterring crime, and meting 
out punishment”); Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 628 (arguing that the 
New York City misdemeanor system operates by a managerial logic in which “the rules of criminal 
procedure and criminal law are used as tools for socially regulating certain populations over time, as 
opposed to punishing individual instances of lawbreaking”); Natapoff, Aggregation, supra note 17, at 
1043 (arguing that “the misdemeanor system as it currently stands does not function as a traditional 
‘criminal’ system of judgment in large part because aggregation erodes the substantive content of 
criminal convictions”). 
 37 See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 645–46 (suggesting that the 
“managerial model” of the criminal justice system and wide prosecutorial discretion explains why 
noncriminal violations and infractions are the “largest conviction category resulting from misdemean-
or arrests”); Sarah Pitcher McDonough, Colorblindness, Discretion, and Systemic Inequities in Crimi-
nal Justice, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 733, 742 (2015) (discussing law enforcement’s “zero-tolerance 
regime[s]” that result in disproportionate arrests for low-level offenses). 
 38 Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 619–29. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Although we do not know the true incidence of most types of misdemeanor-classified behavior, 
we do know that rates of drug use are fairly similar across races, but that drug arrests and case-filing 
rates are not. See Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 257, 266–71 (2009) (noting that despite similar levels of drug use among white and 
black individuals in the United States, policing is more often done in black and low-income neighbor-
hoods).  
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theft, simple assault, and DUI—do not seem like the kind of amorphous pub-
lic-order offenses that permit boundless enforcement discretion. On the other 
hand, possession of marijuana—which does appear conducive to selective 
prosecution41—was the fourth major offense category, and public-order of-
fenses did constitute a meaningful portion of caseloads in many jurisdictions. 
And even theft and assault enforcement may involve more discretion than an 
outsider might assume.42 Overall, though, the data suggest that there is a range 
of phyla in the misdemeanor kingdom, and the extent to which enforcement 
abandons the adjudicative model for a regulatory one may vary by offense 
type. 
The regulatory model does not, however, explain or account for the cross-
jurisdictional heterogeneity documented here. Nor does it explain why misde-
meanor case-filing rates are on the decline, both nationally and in the eight 
jurisdictions we studied. And some key features of the managerial model, in-
cluding dramatic expansion in misdemeanor policing and prosecution, seem to 
be the exception rather than the rule.43 In sum, the present study offers some 
support for the regulatory theme in misdemeanor scholarship, but also demon-
strates its limits. 
At the most fundamental level, the dramatic variation in misdemeanor 
categorization and case processing in the jurisdictions we study calls into ques-
tion the coherence of the very concept of a misdemeanor, or of misdemeanor 
criminal justice. The legal category “misdemeanor” is itself amorphous. The 
offenses it includes are a function of each jurisdiction’s idiosyncratic labelling 
choices, and its boundaries overlap with other sub-felony categories (ordinance 
violations, traffic infractions, and civil offenses). This is to say that the many 
bodies of law that regulate individual conduct below the level of felony crime 
form a tangled jungle. To analyze misdemeanor state court data alone, as we 
have done, is like mapping a square foot of the Amazon. As exploration pro-
ceeds, a careful set of offense definitions tied to the regulated conduct or the 
practical nature of enforcement rather than to contingent legal classifications 
might help to map the contours of this wilderness. In the meantime, courts, 
policymakers, and scholars should take care not to generalize about “misde-
                                                                                                                           
 41 See ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 9 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/aclu-thewaronmarijuana-rel2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6PV-PBDC] (noting that “state and 
local governments have aggressively enforced marijuana laws selectively against Black people and 
communities”). 
 42 See infra notes 167–188 and accompanying text (discussing the possible explanations for racial 
disparities in the number of theft and assault cases).  
 43 See Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 643–47 (discussing the uptick in 
arrests and charges for misdemeanors). 
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meanors” on the false assumption that the term describes a coherent set of uni-
versally criminalized behaviors. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the eight jurisdictions 
in the study and misdemeanor law and practice in each.44 Part II presents the 
empirical results.45 Part III highlights the central takeaways from the empirical 
analysis.46 Part IV explores the implications of the analysis for our understand-
ing of misdemeanor offenses and the misdemeanor system.47 
Although we believe that the cross-jurisdictional analysis is illuminating, 
it is important to caution, at the outset, against drawing simple comparisons 
across these jurisdictions. The degree of local variation in both misdemeanor 
law and practice is extreme. Differences in demographics and local practice 
influence misdemeanor process and outcomes in ways for which we cannot 
control. The suboptimal state of criminal justice data infrastructure complicates 
things further. Nonetheless, we hope to offer a platform for others to work 
from, and to open the empirical window on the workings of misdemeanor jus-
tice a bit farther. 
I. EIGHT MISDEMEANOR SYSTEMS 
A. The Eight Jurisdictions 
The eight jurisdictions used in this analysis were chosen largely because 
we had access to detailed, individual-level court records from each. Fortuitous-
ly, though, they are diverse in terms of geography, population, and racial de-
mographics. They include the densely populated urban districts of Philadelph-
ia, Chicago, and Houston; San Antonio, a medium-sized city with a large His-
panic population; the small cities of Louisville and Fairfax; and the predomi-
nantly white rural counties of Kentucky and Virginia. The populations and ra-
cial composition of the jurisdictions are shown below in Table 1.48  
                                                                                                                           
 44 See infra notes 48–91 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 92–139 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 140–164 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 165–199 and accompanying text. 
 48 Because the most recent year for which complete data were available in every jurisdiction dur-
ing our research was 2013, several of our analyses focus on that year. Population Estimates by Age, 
Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-
kits/2018/estimates-characteristics.html# [https://perma.cc/F72H-T4JP]. In some cases, the sum of the 
white, black, and Hispanic populations is greater than the total. This is likely because the category 
“Hispanic” is not exclusive of “white” or “black”; some people will have self-identified as two of the 
three. 
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Table 1: Jurisdiction Demographics 
Jurisdiction Data Years Major City Pop. White Black Hisp. 
Bexar County, TX 2011-2016 San Antonio 1.8M 85% 8% 59% 
Harris County, TX 2011-2013 Houston 4.3M 71% 20% 42% 
Philadelphia County, PA 2011-2015 Philadelphia 1.5M 45% 45% 13% 
Cook County, IL 2011-2013 Chicago 5.2M 66% 25% 25% 
Jefferson County, KY 2011-2016 Louisville 0.7M 74% 21% 5% 
Rural KY 2011-2016 N/A 2.6M 93% 5% 3% 
Fairfax County, VA 2011-2016 Fairfax 1.1M 67% 10% 16% 
Rural VA 2011-2016 N/A 2.5M 83% 14% 3% 
Note: The race percentages do not sum to one because both white and black defendants may also identify as 
Hispanic. 
In addition to analyzing the court records, we also interviewed defenders, 
prosecutors, judges, clerks, and other knowledgeable criminal justice practi-
tioners in each jurisdiction. These interviews provided information about local 
misdemeanor practices that helps to illuminate the empirical results. 
B. Common Elements in Misdemeanor Law and Practice 
To some extent, it is possible to describe misdemeanor criminal justice 
across these eight jurisdictions in common terms. To start, a body of federal 
constitutional law provides common legal scaffolding. Most core constitutional 
protections for criminal defendants apply to felony and misdemeanor proceed-
ings alike, including the prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures,49 
coerced self-incrimination,50 and excessive bail;51 the right to confrontation 
and cross-examination;52 and the due-process requirement that the state prove 
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.53 In other arenas, the 
Supreme Court has developed misdemeanor-specific jurisprudence. It has de-
clined to interpret the Fourth Amendment as prohibiting warrantless arrest for 
minor, non-violent crimes—although states may certainly do so.54 Warrantless 
                                                                                                                           
 49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 50 Id. amend. V. 
 51 Id. amend. VIII. 
 52 Id. amend. VI. 
 53 Id. amend. V; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that “the Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”). 
 54 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354–55 (2001) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment did not prohibit arrest for a seat-belt violation). An arrest based on probable cause will not vio-
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home entry to effect a misdemeanor arrest “should be rare,” but the Court has 
stopped short of holding that it will always be unconstitutional.55 Once 
charged, a person accused of a misdemeanor has the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial only if the offense is punishable by more than six months’ impris-
onment or if the authorized penalties, in combination, are “so severe as to indi-
cate that the legislature considered the offense serious.”56 The jury must be 
constituted of at least six jurors.57 There is no Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel unless the adjudication results in an actual sentence of imprisonment (in-
cluding a suspended sentence).58 An uncounseled conviction may later be used 
for purposes of sentencing enhancement in future criminal proceedings so long 
as the uncounseled conviction required the state to prove the underlying charge 
beyond a reasonable doubt.59 
The substantive statutory law defining misdemeanor offenses also has 
common features across our eight jurisdictions.60 Each defines the category 
“misdemeanor” in terms of the maximum sentence of imprisonment author-
ized, which is one year everywhere except Pennsylvania.61 Each state’s penal 
code contains several hundred offenses explicitly designated as misdemeanors, 
and others identifiable as misdemeanors because of the authorized sentence.62 
Beyond the penal code, there are many hundreds of additional misdemeanor 
offenses scattered throughout each jurisdiction’s statutes, including heavy con-
centrations of traffic and regulatory offenses. In addition, each state authorizes 
                                                                                                                           
late the Fourth Amendment even if it violates state law. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177–78 
(2008) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when police officers arrested an individ-
ual for driving with a suspended license even though the officers should have issued a summons under 
state law). 
 55 Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 7 (2013) (holding that a police officer who made such entry was 
entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action because the law governing constitutionality of such 
entries was not “clearly established”). 
 56 Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 326 (1996). The fact that multiple charges may result in 
an aggregate sentence of more than six months does not trigger the jury trial right. Id. at 322–23. 
 57 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 244–45 (1978) (holding that a jury of fewer than six jurors 
deprives the defendant of the right to trial by jury).  
 58 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 657, 674 (2002); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 
373–74 (1979) (limiting the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to criminal defendants fac-
ing imprisonment); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (stating that in misdemeanor cases 
“that end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of ‘the 
guiding hand of counsel’”). 
 59 Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994). 
 60 The remainder of the discussion in this section and in Part I.C synthesizes legal information 
and information derived from telephone interviews with local practitioners that is documented in 
greater detail in Appendix A. 
 61 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-55 (West 2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.090 (West 
2019); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 106(b)(6), 1101(4) (West 2019); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 12.21 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11 (2019). 
 62 See infra Table 2. 
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its municipalities to define criminal municipal offenses (by ordinance) that are 
punishable as misdemeanors (they may either be classified as “misdemeanors” 
or classified in other terms but subject to equivalent punishment).63 Many do, 
and municipal offenses tend to overlap significantly with state statutory mis-
demeanors. 
Misdemeanor case processing in each jurisdiction is characterized by in-
formality, volume, and haste. Interviewees from several jurisdictions report 
that pretrial detention has an outsized effect on case outcomes, because those 
detained will often plead guilty for time served in order to obtain release, 
whereas those not in custody are more willing to draw out a case.64 Recent 
empirical work supports that proposition.65 Dismissal rates for non-detention 
cases are reportedly high, particularly as more time elapses, because witnesses 
regularly fail to appear.66 
A misdemeanor case begins with either an arrest, a citation, or a sum-
mons.67 Those arrested will either be released, or they will be detained until the 
case is resolved. The most common mechanisms of pretrial release in our ju-
risdictions were release on recognizance (ROR), where a person simply prom-
ises to return to court; release on an unsecured money bond; or release on a 
secured cash bond that requires up-front payment (cash bail). Bail hearings are 
generally held within forty-eight hours of arrest.68 A judicial officer makes a 
determination of probable cause, explains to each defendant the charge(s) 
against him, and sets a bond or conditions of release. None of our jurisdictions 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See infra Appendix A. In Pennsylvania, municipalities appear limited to defining “summary 
offenses” by ordinance, but summary offenses can be punished by comparable fines and sometimes 
jail. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 106(c), 1101. 
 64 Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, Chief Pub. Def., Pub. Def.’s Office, Harris Cty., Tex. 
(Aug. 28, 2017); Telephone Interview with Michael Morrissey, Deputy, Cook Cty. Pub. Def. (Oct. 11, 
2017). 
 65 Heaton et al., supra note 16, at 741–58 (using a natural experiment as well as regression tech-
niques to evaluate the effect of misdemeanor pretrial detention on case outcomes in Harris County, 
finding that detention significantly increases the likelihood of conviction, and meaningfully increases 
the likelihood that a person will be rearrested within 180 days). 
 66 See Dobbie et al., supra note 16, at 203 (noting that defendants who are released from jail pre-
trial have a lesser likelihood of being convicted). We unfortunately cannot distinguish true dismissals 
from other dispositions (like diversion or deferred adjudication resulting in an eventual dismissal) in 
our data. See infra Part II.A.6. 
 67 See Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 334 (2016) (noting the different 
ways in which criminal cases can begin). There is no uniform definition of an arrest, citation, or sum-
mons, though an arrest generally entails custodial transportation and jail booking. See id. at 310–11 
(offering a “functional definition of arrests”). 
 68 See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–58 (1991) (holding that courts that 
“combine probable cause determinations with other pretrial proceedings” must make a determination 
of probable cause within forty-eight hours after the arrest). 
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provided defense counsel at bail hearings during the period our data covers 
(2011 through 2016). 
In most jurisdictions, the arrest/summons/citation charge only constitutes 
the preliminary charge; the prosecuting agency must then decide what formal 
charges, if any, to file. This prosecutorial determination is among the least 
transparent features of misdemeanor systems.69 The rate at which prosecutors 
declined arrest charges, sometimes called the “declination rate,” was not visi-
ble in our data. Houston is unique in that the police check with the prosecutor’s 
office over the phone before booking a defendant; thus, the declination rate 
there is likely to be low.70 None of the people we interviewed knew the mis-
demeanor declination rate in their jurisdiction.71 
Arraignment, a defendant’s initial appearance in the court of jurisdiction, 
typically happens within a day or two of the bail hearing for defendants in cus-
tody and within a month for others. Interviewees in several jurisdictions re-
ported that many cases resolve at this appearance.72 Defendants in custody 
may plead guilty for time served. Others may be eligible for diversion. 
Arraignment typically marks the point at which the court appoints defense 
counsel for the indigent. All eight jurisdictions claim to provide representation 
for indigent defendants at risk of a carceral sentence, although the mechanisms 
for providing representation differ, and the numbers alone say little about the 
quality of representation. Public defenders whom we interviewed described 
staggering caseloads. None of the jurisdictions provide counsel for offenses 
not punishable by time in jail. 
Nearly all misdemeanor cases in the eight jurisdictions are ultimately dis-
missed by prosecutors or resolved by guilty plea.73 Some percentage of cases are 
dismissed outright. Diversion and deferred adjudication are prevalent across ju-
risdictions, and end either in dismissal—if a defendant complies with all condi-
tions—or in a guilty plea or trial, if she does not. A defendant who is convicted is 
sentenced to jail time, probation, fines and fees, or some combination. 
A last common element in misdemeanor practice across our jurisdictions 
is reform. In recent years there have been two primary areas of change: bail 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Alexandra Natapoff, A Stop Is Just a Stop: Terry’s Formalism, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
113, 125 (2017) (explaining that the “line between being arrested and being charged . . . is not always 
so clear on the ground”). 
 70 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Justice on the Line: Prosecutorial Screening Before Arrest, 2019 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 833, 860–65 (discussing the prosecutorial system in Harris County, Texas). 
 71 Institutional charging practices varied among our jurisdictions. For more information, see infra 
Appendix A. 
 72 Telephone Interview with Mira Baylson, Counsel, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 
(Aug. 25, 2017); Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, supra note 64. 
 73 This is both reported by interviewees and confirmed by the data. The exception is Philadelphia, 
where many misdemeanor cases are tried in bench trials. See infra Part II.C & Appendix A. 
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practice and the prosecution of marijuana possession. All eight jurisdictions 
have pretrial reform efforts underway, efforts centered on limiting the use of 
money bail, implementing actuarial risk assessment, and reducing rates of pre-
trial detention.74 Many have also curbed arrests and prosecution for first-time 
                                                                                                                           
 74 There is not enough room to catalog all of these efforts here, but briefly: Kentucky and Virgin-
ia have each been leaders in pretrial reform and in the use of pretrial risk assessment. See generally, 
e.g., MARIE VANNOSTRAND, VA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., ASSESSING RISK AMONG 
PRETRIAL DEFENDANTS IN VIRGINIA: THE VIRGINIA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 6 
(2003), https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/assessing-
risk-among-pretrial-defendants-virginia-virginia-pretrial-risk-assessment-instrument.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X989-FABT] (discussing the results of a pretrial risk assessment program in Virginia); MARIE 
VANNOSTRAND & KENNETH J. ROSE, LUMINOSITY INC., PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 
1–2 (2009), https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/virginia-
pretrial-risk-assessment-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W686-ZPTR] (discussing the duties and respon-
sibilities of Virginia’s pretrial services agencies); Robert Veldman, Pretrial Detention in Kentucky: 
An Analysis of the Impact of House Bill 463 During the First Two Years of Its Implementation, 102 
KY. L.J. 777, 783–84 (2013) (discussing the various criminal law reforms passed in Kentucky). Ken-
tucky passed state legislation restructuring its pretrial system in 2011. See Veldman, supra, at 783–84 
(discussing the various changes to Kentucky’s pretrial system). In Houston (Harris County), the im-
pact-litigation group Civil Rights Corps filed a federal class-action lawsuit challenging the constitu-
tionality of the misdemeanor bail schedule in 2016. The lawsuit ended in a settlement and dramatic 
restructuring of Harris County’s misdemeanor bail system in 2019. See, e.g., Gabrielle Banks, Federal 
Judge Gives Final Approval to Harris County Bail Deal, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Federal-judge-approves-Harris
-County-bail-deal-14853781.php [https://perma.cc/FX86-EU6D] (describing the “historic bail reform 
agreement” that “set[s] in place new protections for people accused of minor offenses in the country’s 
third largest criminal justice system”). Harris County has also piloted new programs providing defense 
representation at bail hearings and implementing a pretrial risk assessment tool. Mihir Zaveri, Harris 
County to Place Public Defenders at Bail Hearings, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 14, 2017), https://
www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-to-place-public-
defenders-at-bail-11002089.php [https://perma.cc/2Y6G-8BYU]. Philadelphia has been awarded a 
MacArthur Grant to pursue initiatives to improve pretrial practice and reduce its pretrial jail popula-
tions, several of which are underway. Press Release, Phila. Dep’t of Prisons, Office of Criminal Jus-
tice, Office of the Mayor, City Awarded $4 Million by MacArthur Safety and Justice Challenge (Oct. 
24, 2018), https://www.phila.gov/2018-10-24-city-awarded-4-million-by-macarthur-safety-and-
justice-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/ZBF4-3KFR]. The election of District Attorney Larry Krasner in 
2018 further altered Philadelphia bail practice. E.g., Samantha Melamed, Philly DA Larry Krasner 
Stopped Seeking Bail for Low-Level Crimes. Here’s What Happened Next., PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 
19, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/philly-district-attorney-larry-krasner-money-bail-criminal-
justice-reform-incarceration-20190219.html [https://perma.cc/P9Z7-RA33]. And in Chicago, the 
Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court issued a new court rule in July 2017 designed to “en-
sure no defendant is held in custody prior to trial solely because the defendant cannot afford to post 
bail.” General Order No. 18.8A—Procedures for Bail Hearings and Pretrial Release, CIR. CT. OF 
COOK COUNTY, ILL. (July 17, 2017), http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Manage/DivisionOrders/
ViewDivisionOrder/tabid/298/ArticleId/2562/GENERAL-ORDER-NO-18-8A-Procedures-for-Bail-
Hearings-and-Pretrial-Release.aspx [https://perma.cc/H7RJ-Y96X]. Civil Rights Corps, in partnership 
with the MacArthur Justice Center, has also filed a class-action suit challenging money bail practices 
in Cook County, and the Illinois Supreme Court made a new statewide rule change to restrict the use 
of money bail and increase rates of pretrial release. Cook County, IL: Bail, CIV. RTS. CORPS, 
http://www.civilrightscorps.org/work/case/cook-county-il-bail [https://perma.cc/5CFR-UNGH]; Illi-
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possession of marijuana. These changes mean that our data may not entirely re-
flect current practice. But they do provide context for the current reform efforts. 
C. Variation in Misdemeanor Law and Practice 
Notwithstanding the common elements of misdemeanor law and practice 
across our eight jurisdictions, there is also significant variation. To begin with, 
the very definition of a “misdemeanor” varies. Everywhere except Pennsylva-
nia, misdemeanors are those offenses punishable by a maximum of one year’s 
imprisonment, but in Pennsylvania they are punishable by up to five years 
and/or a $10,000 fine. Misdemeanors in Pennsylvania consequently include 
more serious offenses such as involuntary manslaughter and some drug distri-
bution offenses.75 
A second point of variance is the relationship between state and municipal 
law in each place. Each of the states in our study permits municipalities to en-
act their own criminal offenses, which tend to overlap with the state’s penal 
code. Some of these municipal offenses are designated as “misdemeanors.” 
Others are called “violations” or “summary offenses.” Sometimes they carry 
potential jail sentences, and sometimes not.76 To make matters more compli-
cated, every jurisdiction has a different arrangement for channeling these vari-
ous offense classes into court. In some places they are all handled together in 
the same courts; other jurisdictions divide them into subclasses that are fun-
neled into multiple local court systems.77 
There is also significant variation in how cases progress through court.78 
In Texas and Kentucky, defendants have a state-constitutional right to bail.79 In 
                                                                                                                           
nois Supreme Court Issues Substantial Rule Changes Regarding State’s Bail and Bond System, ILL. 
STATE BAR ASSOC. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.isba.org/barnews/2019/03/illinoissupremecourt
issuessubstanti [https://perma.cc/6ND5-SXK8] (reporting on rule changes enacted to align with recent 
revisions of the bond system). 
 75 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (involuntary manslaughter); 35 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-113 (West 2019) (inter alia, distribution of adulterated controlled substances). 
 76 Texas municipal codes, for instance, include criminal offenses that are designated as Class C 
misdemeanors but do not carry jail sentences. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE chs. 3–6, 10–12, 15, 16, 21, 
22, 31, 34–36 (2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.06 (West 2019). The Philadelphia munic-
ipal code, by contrast, includes offenses that do carry jail sentences but that are not explicitly desig-
nated as misdemeanors. E.g., PHILA., PA., CODE ch. 10-100, § 10-115 (2020) (providing that “[i]n 
addition to any fine, imprisonment for not more than 90 days may be imposed for a violation of § 10-
104.2 [prohibiting vicious animals on city playgrounds]”). 
 77 In Kentucky and Virginia, state misdemeanors and municipal offenses are handled together in 
the “district courts.” In Texas, by contrast, jailable misdemeanors are handled in the “County Courts at 
Law,” although non-jailable misdemeanors (both state and municipal) are handled in justice-of-the-
peace (JP) and municipal courts. In Philadelphia and Chicago, state-law offenses and municipal of-
fenses are handled in the same court but on separate dockets. See infra Appendix A. 
 78 For details and sources, see infra Appendix A. 
 79 KY. CONST. § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
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the other states, courts can order a defendant detained pretrial under certain 
conditions. Bail bondsmen are prevalent in Texas and Virginia, play a more 
limited role in Philadelphia and Chicago due to those jurisdictions’ use of a 
deposit system, and have been abolished in Kentucky. Philadelphia is an outli-
er in adjudication procedure; a much higher percentage of misdemeanor cases 
go to trial than elsewhere due to a culture of expedited bench trials. Diversion 
and deferred adjudications are common everywhere but work quite differently 
from place to place. 
Table 2 summarizes key legal and institutional features of misdemeanor 
case processing across the eight jurisdictions we studied. The table synthesizes 
information that is presented more fully, and with applicable source citations, 
in Appendix A. The discussion will address relevant jurisdictional differences 
in more depth as it proceeds. 
Table 2: Legal and Institutional Features of Misdemeanor Adjudication80 
 
PA/ 
Philadelphia 
IL/ 
Chicago TX VA KY 
State-Law Misdemeanors 
Maximum carceral  
sentence 5 yrs. 1 yr. 1 yr. 1 yr. 1 yr. 
Maximum fine 
(for an individual) $10,000 $2,500 $4,000 $2,500 $500 
Approx. number of 
misdemeanors in penal 
code 
212 206 162 290 145 
Traffic misdemeanors 
in penal code None None DUIs DUIs DUIs 
Approx. number of 
misdemeanors in other  
statutes 
840 860 600 830 330 
Approx. number of 
state traffic misde-
meanors  
36 111 139 135 14 
Classification scheme 1st, 2nd, 3rd 
degree, 
summary 
offenses 
Classes A, B, 
C, petty 
offenses, 
business 
offenses 
Classes  
A, B, C 
Classes 1, 2, 
3, 4, traffic 
infractions 
Classes A, B, 
violations 
Municipal vs. State Law 
Municipality can enact 
overlapping offenses? 
Yes 
Yes, if not 
preempted 
or contra 
state  
policy 
Law says no, 
but they do 
(same  
penalty) 
Yes; penal-
ties cannot 
exceed state 
penalty 
Yes; penalty 
must be 
identical to 
state  
penalty 
Municipality codes 
include “misdemean-
ors”? 
Yes (plus 
summary  
offenses,  
Yes Yes (Class C) Yes 
Yes (plus  
violations) 
                                                                                                                           
 80 For additional details and sources, see infra Appendix A. 
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PA/ 
Philadelphia 
IL/ 
Chicago TX VA KY 
violations) 
Municipality codes 
include jailable offens-
es? 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes (but few) 
What are most traffic 
offenses? Summary 
offenses 
Municipal  
misde-
meanors 
State-law 
misde-
meanors 
(Class C) 
Non-criminal 
infractions 
(state or 
muni) 
Violations 
Institutional Structure 
Court(s) that handle(s) 
state-law misdemeanors 
at the trial level 
Municipal 
Court 
Dailey 
Center, 555 
W. Harri-
son, branch 
courtrooms, 
Criminal 
Court 
Class A/B: 
County 
Courts at 
Law; 
Class C: 
Justice-of-
the-Peace 
& Munici-
pal Courts 
District 
Courts 
District 
Courts 
Indigent defense 
Public  
Defender 
Public  
Defender 
Class A/B: 
Public  
Defender 
(limited), 
appointed 
counsel; 
Class C: 
none 
Public  
Defender/ 
Court- 
appointed 
from list 
Public  
Defender 
Court(s) that handle(s) 
municipal offenses Municipal Court (sepa-
rate docket) 
Dailey 
Center, 
branch 
courtrooms 
Justice-of-
the-Peace 
& Munici-
pal Courts 
District 
Courts 
District 
Courts 
Agency that prosecutes 
District  
Attorney 
City  
Attorney 
District  
Attorney 
Common-
wealth  
Attorney (or 
arresting 
officer) 
County  
Attorney 
Where traffic offenses 
are processed Post-2016: 
Municipal 
Court Traffic 
Division  
 
Pre-2017: 
Traffic Court 
Dailey Center 
“minor 
traffic 
rooms” 
DUIs in 
County 
Courts; 
most others 
in Justice-
of-the-
Peace & 
Municipal 
Courts 
District 
Courts 
District 
Courts 
Summons vs. Arrest 
Summons-eligible  
misdemeanor offenses 
2nd/ 3rd de-
gree misde-
meanor, 1st 
degree DUI 
Any  
misdemeanor 
All Class C, 
some A/B 
Any  
misdemeanor 
Any  
misdemeanor 
Summons-mandatory 
misdemeanor offenses Same (under 
certain con-
ditions) 
None None 
Class 3, 4 
misde-
meanor; 
some Class 
1, 2 under 
Same (under 
certain  
conditions) 
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PA/ 
Philadelphia 
IL/ 
Chicago TX VA KY 
certain  
conditions 
Pretrial Custody 
Right-to-bail state? 
No 
For those not 
facing  
mandatory  
carceral  
sentence 
Yes Ambiguous Yes 
Bail bondsmen  
authorized? 
Yes, but rare 
in  
Philadelphia 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Fixed bail schedules 
authorized? No Yes Yes No No 
Defense representation 
at bail hearings? 
No Yes 
Harris 
County: 
No; 
Bexar Coun-
ty: ? 
Mostly No Mostly Yes 
Idiosyncrasies 
 
More serious 
misdemean-
ors; waiver 
track; bail 
deposit  
program; 
separate  
traffic court 
(until 2016). 
 
Most traffic 
offenses, 
Class C 
misde-
meanors 
and all 
municipal 
misde-
meanors in 
justice-of-
the-peace & 
municipal 
courts. 
Traffic 
 infractions 
are  
non-criminal. 
No bail 
bondsmen; 
all state and 
municipal  
offenses  
handled  
together in 
District 
Courts. 
D. The Datasets 
Our data consist of detailed, individual-level court records from each of 
the jurisdictions described above. We acquired the data for Philadelphia, Hou-
ston, and Kentucky in the course of other research projects.81 Philadelphia and 
Houston data were web-scraped from online public court records,82 and the 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Heaton et al., supra note 16 (quantitative study of misdemeanor bail and pretrial detention in 
Harris County, Texas); Stevenson, supra note 16 (quantitative study of bail and pretrial detention in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania). See generally Megan T. Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 
103 MINN. L. REV. 303 (2018) (quantitative study of bail and pretrial detention in Kentucky after 
implementation of a risk assessment tool). 
 82 For Philadelphia, Common Pleas Court docket sheets were web-scraped from the Unified Judi-
cial System of Pennsylvania’s Web Portal. The dataset for this article contains all cases that originated 
in municipal court where the most serious original charge is a misdemeanor between the years 2011–
2015. Common Pleas Courts Docket Sheets, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. OF PA. WEB PORTAL [hereinafter PA 
DOCKET SHEETS], https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CP.aspx [https://perma.cc/NA4Q-7R8P]. 
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Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts provided the Kentucky data up-
on request.83 Data for the San Antonio area as well as for all Virginia jurisdic-
tions are publicly available online.84 Civil Rights Corps and the Macarthur Jus-
tice Project shared the Chicago-area data, which they had previously acquired 
from Cook County courts pursuant to an open records request.85  
Depending on the jurisdiction, the data contain hundreds of thousands to 
more than a million court records describing misdemeanor cases. Each court 
record, in turn, contains some combination of the following: individual demo-
graphic information (sex, age, race), charged offense(s), information relating to 
bail and pretrial release, information relating to defense representation (i.e. 
presence of counsel and counsel type—public defender, appointed private, or 
private), adjudication information, and sentencing information. Because each 
jurisdiction codifies hundreds of misdemeanor crimes, it was necessary to 
group them into meaningful categories for the sake of the analysis. We coded 
the offense descriptions at several levels of generality,86 ultimately matching 
                                                                                                                           
For Houston, data was web-scraped from the website of the Harris County District Clerk. The dataset 
contains all misdemeanor cases filed in the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law between the years 
2011–2013. OFFICE OF HARRIS CTY. DIST. CLERK—MARILYN BURGESS [hereinafter HOUS. DOCKET 
SHEETS], https://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/eDocs/Public/NewUserAcknowledgement.aspx [https://
perma.cc/G6KW-UULW].  
 83 Statistical Reports, KY. COURT OF JUSTICE [hereinafter KY DOCKET SHEETS], https://courts.ky.
gov/aoc/statisticalreports/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/HWQ8-KU52]. The data include all 
cases in which the most serious charge was a misdemeanor between the years 2011–2016. 
 84 VA. JUDICIAL SYS. [hereinafter VA DOCKET SHEETS], http://www.courts.state.va.us/ [https://
perma.cc/CH3M-XNFU]. A private individual has web-scraped and aggregated this data for public 
use. VA. COURT DATA, http://virginiacourtdata.org/ [https://perma.cc/7GUW-XDHQ]. The dataset for 
this article includes all misdemeanor cases filed in the Virginia circuit and district courts between the 
years 2011–2016. The Bexar County data was downloaded from the website of the District Clerk, and 
includes all misdemeanor cases filed in the Bexar County district courts between the years 2011–
2016. Reports & Records Searches, BEXAR CTY. COURTHOUSE, ONLINE SERVS. [hereinafter SAN 
ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS], https://www.bexar.org/254/Reports-Record-Searches [https://perma.cc/
23D9-KNBR]. 
 85 Civil Rights Corps obtained the data via a Freedom of Information Act request for all misde-
meanor cases in Cook County between the years 2011–2013 [hereinafter CHI. DOCKET SHEETS]. As 
noted below, the data received is missing several misdemeanor categories. Based on interviews and 
data analysis, we presume that data received is from the main misdemeanor court. We have omitted 
Chicago from the analysis when the data were not reliable enough to include.  
 86 We first coded each offense description at a fairly specific level (for example, all offenses that 
appeared to be resisting-arrest charges were coded as “resisting arrest”; all offenses related to gam-
bling were coded as “gambling”), and then at a more general level, by matching every offense to a 
more general offense type: DUI, possession of marijuana, other controlled substance offenses, offens-
es relating to minors, property damage, public-order offenses, regulatory offenses (i.e. violations of 
regulations governing commercial activity, fishing, hunting, gambling, etc.), prostitution, other sex-
related offenses, non-DUI traffic offenses, theft/fraud/burglary offenses, violent offenses, weapons 
offenses, and miscellaneous offenses. These offense types were then grouped into the following seven 
categories: drugs, DUI, public-order, theft, traffic, violent, and other. 
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each offense to seven primary offense categories: drugs, DUI, public-order, 
theft, traffic, violent, and other.87 
In each jurisdiction, our dataset contains the misdemeanor cases pro-
cessed in what we might call the main misdemeanor courts: the state courts 
that adjudicate most of the offenses designated as “misdemeanors.” Because of 
the variation in local law and practice, though, the scope of the datasets differs. 
The Kentucky and Virginia datasets include all state and municipal misde-
meanors, including a significant volume of traffic cases.88 In the other jurisdic-
tions, the lower courts are more fragmented and the records of the “main mis-
demeanor courts” are more limited.89 Table 3 depicts the offense types that 
each dataset covers. 
                                                                                                                           
 87 For Philadelphia, San Antonio, and Houston—datasets that contained only several hundred 
offense descriptions each—we were able to do this coding comprehensively. Unfortunately, the other 
jurisdictions had “open-form” text entry for inputting the offense data, resulting in wide discrepancies 
in the shorthand used for describing an offense. For instance, reckless driving at 15-miles-per-hour 
above the speed limit could be written “R/D-15 MPH OVER,” “RD 15,” “RECKLESS 15MPH,” as 
well as any permutation of those terms. (Some jurisdictions also included a reference to the statute 
number of the charged offense, but no jurisdiction had a uniform method for inputting statute numbers 
either, so there was similar variation among listed statute references.) This resulted in tens of thou-
sands of distinct offense descriptions. We began by coding a random sample of several thousand rec-
ords and then matched the coded offenses from this random sample back to the complete dataset. In 
addition, we used a computational method known as “regular expressions” to identify common abbre-
viations and wordings. (For example, we wrote code to search for all offense descriptions containing 
the phrase “R/D” and categorized these as reckless driving.) Ultimately, we were able to categorize 
92% of offenses in Virginia and more than 99% of offenses in the other jurisdictions. The files we 
used to code offenses are on file with the authors and available for review or duplication. In addition, 
Appendix B documents the last stage of our grouping process, enumerating the more specific offense 
groups that we ultimately included in each of our final seven categories. 
 88 In Kentucky, state and municipal misdemeanors are handled together in the district courts. KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24A.110, 83A.065 (West 2019). In Virginia, municipal misdemeanors are han-
dled in the district courts, and state-law misdemeanors are handled in the circuit courts, but our data 
includes both. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-123.1, 16.1-126, 17.1-513 (2019). 
 89 The Houston and San Antonio datasets, which derive from the County Courts at Law, include 
all jail-eligible misdemeanors but generally exclude fine-only (“Class C”) misdemeanors, which are 
processed in JP or municipal court, depending on the arresting agency. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§§ 27.031, 29.003 (West 2019). A handful of Class C misdemeanors, however, do show up in our 
data. Interviewees explained that Class C cases are occasionally adjudicated in the County Courts at 
Law if the District Attorney (DA) downgrades a Class A or B arrest charge, or if the Class C charge 
arises from the same incident as Class A or B charges and so is filed alongside them in the County 
Court. The Philadelphia dataset includes all misdemeanors, but they are more serious than in other 
places; they include few traffic and no fine-only offenses. The Chicago dataset includes all state-law 
misdemeanors except for traffic offenses. This may be because traffic misdemeanors are coded as 
“vehicle offenses” rather than “misdemeanor offenses” in the court’s database, although they are in 
fact both. See Telephone Interview with Joe Magats, First Assistant, Cook Cty. State Attorney’s Of-
fice (Apr. 12, 2018). The Chicago dataset excludes municipal offenses. 
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Table 3: Case-Types Included in Each Dataset 
 
At first, the variation in the scope of the datasets seemed like a major lim-
itation of the data because it is difficult to make cross-jurisdictional compari-
sons with no common baseline. Eventually, however, we began to view this not 
as a limitation of the data, but rather as a fundamental feature of misdemeanor 
justice in the United States, a theme that we take up in Part IV. In the end, an 
empirical analysis focused on cases adjudicated in the main misdemeanor 
courts seemed as sensible a level of analysis as any. We have, however, made 
one modification to enhance consistency across jurisdictions: we have omitted 
non-DUI traffic offenses from most of the analysis.90 Their incidence is report-
ed in Part II.A, and we hope to conduct a more in-depth analysis of misde-
meanor traffic offenses in future research. Once non-DUI traffic offenses are 
excluded, the remaining caseloads exhibit enough consistency across jurisdic-
tions to make meaningful comparison possible.91 Thus, the unit of analysis in 
the bulk of this paper is non-traffic misdemeanor cases tried in the relevant 
jurisdiction’s main misdemeanor courts. 
Part II presents a cross-jurisdictional analysis of misdemeanor criminal 
justice. It is tempting to draw inferences from the comparison, seeking a causal 
story behind the differences and similarities shown. We encourage the reader—
and have endeavored ourselves—to resist this temptation. The jurisdictions in 
this analysis vary so widely that it would be highly difficult to pinpoint reasons 
for the differences. Think of this study instead like a butterfly collection: a 
                                                                                                                           
 90 The rationale for this modification is that (1) in each dataset, non-DUI traffic misdemeanors are 
the largest subcategory of misdemeanors, and (2) traffic offenses are often handled significantly dif-
ferently from other misdemeanors (many are fine-only and originate with citation instead of arrest, 
etc.). 
 91 See infra Part II.A. 
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presentation of colorful examples within the loosely defined phylum of “mis-
demeanor criminal justice.” The goal is simply to see what is there. 
II. A CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL STUDY OF MISDEMEANOR COURT RECORDS 
This Part proceeds in three sections. Section A documents basic features of 
case processing in each jurisdiction: defendant demographics, case-filing rates, 
the frequency of cases with multiple charges, defense representation rates, con-
viction rates, case duration, and racial disparities in case-filing and conviction 
rates.92 Section B presents information about pretrial release and detention.93 
Section C synthesizes sentencing data across our eight jurisdictions.94 
A. Overview Metrics 
1. Defendant Demographics 
We know that many people find themselves in misdemeanor court—but 
who are they? In our data, the age and gender composition of defendants 
across jurisdictions was fairly consistent. In all jurisdictions the average de-
fendant age was between thirty-one and thirty-five, and between 67% and 77% 
of defendants were male.95 Racial composition was more varied, reflecting in 
part the racial composition of the regions. Rural Kentucky had the highest per-
centage of white defendants (88%) and the lowest percentage of black defend-
ants (10%);96 the converse was true of Chicago (22% of defendants were white 
and 61% were black).97 Hispanic people represented 40% of San Antonio mis-
demeanor defendants but only a small fraction of defendants in Virginia.98 The 
data do not reliably document the percentage of Hispanic defendants in other 
jurisdictions. We note, too, that race data were missing in a significant minority 
of cases in Philadelphia and the Chicago area. 
It is well known that the U.S. criminal justice system has a disproportion-
ate impact on people of color,99 and the misdemeanor systems in this study are 
no exception. Relative to the demographics of the general population, black 
people were overrepresented in the misdemeanor defendant population in eve-
                                                                                                                           
 92 See infra notes 95–126 and accompanying text. 
 93 See infra notes 127–135 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 136–139 and accompanying text. 
 95 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (providing datasets for all eight jurisdictions 
studied). 
 96 KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83. 
 97 CHI. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 85. 
 98 SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84; VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84. 
 99 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (chronicling the many ways in which the U.S. criminal justice sys-
tem discriminates against people of color). 
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ry single jurisdiction. The most dramatic discrepancy was in the Chicago area, 
where black people comprised 22% of the general population but 61% of mis-
demeanor defendants. The discrepancy was smallest in Philadelphia.100 Table 4 
includes the racial demographics of the defendants in our dataset as well as the 
black/white proportions of each jurisdiction’s general population. Figure 1 il-
lustrates the discrepancies in racial demographics. 
Table 4: Defendant Demographics 
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Age N/A 31 31 35 N/A N/A 34 35 
Black 61% 39% 13% 47% 25% 20% 39% 9% 
(in Gen. Pop.) 22% 20% 8% 45% 10% 14% 21% 5% 
White 22% 58% 44% 37% 65% 76% 60% 87% 
(in Gen. Pop.) 66% 71% 85% 45% 67% 83% 74% 93% 
Hispanic N/A N/A 41% N/A 2% 2% N/A N/A 
Other/Unknown 14% 3% 2% 13% 8% 2% 1% 4% 
Male N/A 77% 72% 77% 78% 72% 70% 65% 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Notably, Chicago (Cook County) is much larger than Philadelphia County in terms of both 
population (5.2 versus 1.5 million, respectively) and land area (233.2 versus 142.71 square miles, 
respectively). Population, Housing Units, Area, and Density: 2010 - United States—Congressional 
District by State; and for Puerto Rico, Am. FactFinder, U.S. Census Bureau, https://factfinder.census.
gov/faces/tableser ices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_SF1_GCTPH1.US04PR&prod
Type=table [https://perma.cc/E3X6-DX3V]; supra Table 1. 
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Figure 1: Racial Representation in Misdemeanor Court 
 
Note: This graph compares the percentage of residents in each jurisdiction that are 
white/black against the percentage of misdemeanor cases in each jurisdiction that are filed 
against white/black defendants. 
2. Case-Filing Rates 
How big is the misdemeanor system? In recent work, we analyzed nation-
al-level data to estimate that approximately 13.2 million misdemeanor cases—
42.6 per 1,000 people—are filed in the United States each year.101 This esti-
mate includes all “criminal traffic cases.”102 We find very similar case-filing 
rates in the jurisdictions studied here. The average number of misdemeanor 
cases filed in 2013, including all traffic offenses tried in the main misdemeanor 
court, was 40.4 per 1,000 inhabitants.103 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 745. 
 102 Id. This term leaves some room for interpretation. See id. at 739–40 (noting that “states and 
localities vary tremendously in what proportion of traffic offenses, if any, they classify as ‘criminal,’ 
and as ‘criminal misdemeanors’”). 
 103 This is a weighted average across jurisdictions, where the weights correspond to population 
size. 
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This is not to say that the misdemeanor case-filing rate is the same eve-
rywhere. On the contrary, it varies substantially. In our data, the total number 
of cases filed per 1,000 inhabitants varied from thirteen in Philadelphia to 
eighty-five in rural Kentucky. But this large range is mostly due to differences 
in the number of non-DUI traffic cases handled in the “main misdemeanor 
courts”: many are handled in Kentucky and Virginia’s main courts, but few are 
handled in the main misdemeanor courts in other jurisdictions. Figure 2 illus-
trates 2013 filing rates across our jurisdictions, broken down into traffic and 
non-traffic cases. We show case-filing rates for traffic offenses only in the ju-
risdictions where we have access to all of them: Kentucky and Virginia. The 
case-filing rates for non-traffic misdemeanor cases (including DUIs) also var-
ied, but less so, ranging from thirteen per 1,000 inhabitants to thirty-five. The 
rest of the analyses in this study exclude non-DUI traffic offenses unless oth-
erwise noted. 
Figure 2: Misdemeanor Cases per 1,000 Inhabitants (2013) 
 
Note: This graph shows case-filing rates (annual number of cases filed per 1,000 inhabit-
ants) for both non-traffic misdemeanor cases and, where available, traffic misdemeanor cases in 
each jurisdiction. DUI is counted here as a non-traffic case. 
In every jurisdiction, the most prevalent offense types by far were posses-
sion of marijuana, petty theft, DUI, and simple assault/battery. We consider these 
the “big four” misdemeanor offenses. These big four offenses account for 50–
60% of cases in most jurisdictions (slightly lower in Virginia, in which the data 
include a larger number of low-level misdemeanor offenses). Other common 
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misdemeanor offenses were public intoxication, trespass, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, prostitution, resisting arrest, underage drinking, vandalism, failing 
to give information or giving false information to police, weapons possession, 
possession of criminal instruments (e.g. burglary tools), threats/harassment, vio-
lation of animal laws, and general regulatory offenses. 
Figure 3 shows the 2013 case-filing rates for six general offense catego-
ries: violent, theft, public-order, drug, DUI, and “other” offenses.104 The rela-
tive frequency of these different offense categories varied considerably across 
jurisdictions, but not in a highly consistent way.  
Figure 3: Case-Filing Rates by Offense Type 
 
Note: This graph shows the case-filing rates (annual number of cases filed per 1,000 in-
habitants) for various misdemeanor offense categories. 
Figure 4 shows time trends in the total number of violent-crime, theft, 
public-order crime, and drug filings per year across the eight jurisdictions. The 
time trends have been normalized to represent a percentage change from 2011. 
Although the patterns are noisy, there is an overall downward trend in the year-
ly number of case filings in all jurisdictions. Louisville, rural Virginia, and San 
Antonio all saw particularly pronounced declines in the yearly number of mis-
                                                                                                                           
 104 The Chicago data do not include DUIs. 
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demeanors: a drop of more than 25% since 2011. These trends are consistent 
with the time trends we have observed in national-level data.105 
Figure 4: Case-Filing Rates by Offense Type 
 
Note: This graph shows a time trend in the misdemeanor case-filing rate (annual 
number of misdemeanor cases per 1,000 inhabitants). The graph has been normalized so 
that the case filing rate in each year can be interpreted as the percent of case-filing rate in 
2011. 
3. Charges Per Case 
There was considerable variation in the frequency with which people 
were charged with multiple offenses in a single case. In Chicago, most cases 
were single-charge cases,106 whereas in Philadelphia and Kentucky most cases 
included multiple charges.107 The single-charge rate in San Antonio, Houston, 
and Virginia was 100%,108 but this reflects case-filing practices rather than ar-
rest practices; although police may arrest a person on multiple charges, each 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 744–55 (noting the downward trend in rates of mis-
demeanor case-filings rates and in arrests for likely misdemeanors offenses). 
 106 CHI. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 85. 
 107 KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83; PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82. 
 108 HOUSTON DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84; 
VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84. 
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charge is then filed as a separate case. Interviewees report that court clerks 
sometimes try to schedule multiple cases arising out of the same arrest in tan-
dem, but this does not always happen.109 
Table 5: Charges per Case 
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% cases with 1 charge 76 100 100 45 100 100 48 49 
Avg. # charges 1.4 1 1 1.85 1 1 2.04 2.19 
4. Defense Representation Rates 
The court records did not contain consistent data on defense representa-
tion. A defense attorney was listed on more than 90% of cases in Philadelphia, 
and interviewees reported that misdemeanor defendants always have counsel 
present unless they insist on self-representation.110 Interviewees from Houston, 
San Antonio, and Chicago reported that virtually all misdemeanor defendants 
in those jurisdictions have access to counsel as well,111 but we could not inde-
pendently verify this in the data.  
In Virginia, the records document that only 55–60% of misdemeanor de-
fendants had counsel. Though a large majority of the Virginia cases were regu-
latory or public-order charges unlikely to result in prison sentences, around 8% 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Telephone Interview with Nicole Galioto, Special Projects and Training Specialist for the 
Fairfax Cty. Gen. Dist. Court (Sept. 3, 2017) (with respect to Virginia); Telephone Interview with 
Susanne Pringle, Senior Staff Attorney, Tex. Fair Def. Project (Apr. 28, 2018) (with respect to Hou-
ston); Telephone Interview with Judge Tommy Stolhandske, Bexar Cty., Tex., Cty. Court 11, and 
Amy Castano, Court Coordinator, Bexar Cty., Tex., Cty. Court 11 (Sept. 14, 2017) (with respect to 
San Antonio). 
 110 Telephone Interview with Sarah Allen, Counsel, Def. Ass’n of Phila. (Nov. 6, 2017); Tele-
phone Interview with Mira Baylson, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Derek Riker, Deputy 
Inspector Gen., City of Phila. (Oct. 2, 2017). 
 111 Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, supra note 64 (with respect to Houston); Telephone 
Interview with Mike Morrissey, supra note 64 (with respect to Chicago); Telephone Interview with 
Susanne Pringle, supra note 109 (with respect to Houston); Telephone Interview with Parlé Roe-
Taylor, Chief, Cook Cty. Pub. Def. (Oct. 12, 2017) (with respect to Chicago); Telephone Interview 
with Judge Stolhandske and Amy Castano, supra note 109 (with respect to San Antonio); Telephone 
Interview with Alexa Van Brunt, Attorney, MacArthur Justice Ctr. (Aug. 25, 2017) (with respect to 
Chicago). 
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of those who received a carceral sentence in Fairfax and 11% of those who 
received a carceral sentence in rural Virginia did not have a defense attorney 
listed on their docket. It is unclear whether these gaps reflect missing data or 
missing attorneys. 
Attorney information was not available in the Kentucky data. Interview-
ees reported that a public defender should be appointed for any indigent de-
fendant in Kentucky at risk of a loss of liberty, although actual practice might 
vary by county.112 
It is important to note that our data do not specify the precise point at 
which an attorney was appointed and present. Interviews suggest, for instance, 
that defense representation at bail hearings was relatively rare in the years our 
data cover.113 Research in other jurisdictions has found that misdemeanor 
courts sometimes appoint counsel only after a defendant has announced her 
intention to plead not guilty.114 A notation reflecting defense counsel alone 
therefore provides somewhat limited information. 
5. Case Duration 
Jurisdictions also varied in the amount of time between when the case is 
first filed and when it is finally disposed. With the exception of the San Anto-
nio area, more than three-quarters of cases in all jurisdictions were resolved 
within six months.115 In the Houston area, more than a third of cases were re-
solved within two weeks.116 In Fairfax and rural Virginia, fewer than 7% of 
cases were decided within two weeks.117 Cases with deferred adjudication do 
not show a final resolution date until the supervisory period has elapsed, a fact 
that explains the long time-to-disposition for some cases. 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, Manager, Ky. Dep’t of the Pub. Advocate (Apr. 5, 
2018). 
 113 See supra Table 2; infra Appendix A. 
 114 See generally State Bar of Ga. Indigent Def. Comm., Report on the Status of Indigent Defense 
Representation in the Misdemeanor Courts of Georgia (June 18, 2018) (unpublished report) (on file 
with authors). 
 115 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (providing datasets for all eight jurisdictions 
studied). 
 116 HOUS. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82. 
 117 VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84. 
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Figure 5: Time to Disposition 
 
Note: This graph shows the fraction of misdemeanor cases that are adjudicated within two 
weeks and six months, respectively. 
6. Trial and Conviction Rates 
 In all jurisdictions except Philadelphia, only a miniscule percentage of mis-
demeanor cases were tried.118 Conviction rates varied widely across jurisdic-
tions, from a low of 27% in Chicago to a high of 72% in rural Kentucky. Con-
sidering the infrequency of cases going to trial, with the exception of Philadelph-
ia, these conviction rates essentially represent the rate of conviction by guilty 
plea. 
It is important to remember that these numbers represent rates of convic-
tion among cases filed, rather than among arrests. Some of the variation in 
conviction rates might derive from jurisdictional differences in how many cas-
es prosecutors filter out at the charging stage. In Houston, for instance, an As-
sistant District Attorney (ADA) is always on call to make charging decisions. 
Arresting officers promptly call the DA’s office to report an arrest, and an ADA 
determines whether or not to “take” the charges.119 This pre-case-filing filter-
ing mechanism might be part of the explanation for Houston’s relatively high 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Fewer than 1% in all jurisdictions. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (providing 
datasets for all eight jurisdictions studied). 
 119 Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, supra note 64. 
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conviction rate. Yet the Kentucky jurisdictions we studied also have high convic-
tion rates, and interviewees report that prosecutors do not make an independent 
charging decision in Kentucky; the charges at arrest simply proceed to court.120 
Table 6: Conviction Rates 
Chicago San Antonio Rural VA Fairfax Phila-delphia Louisville Houston 
Rural 
KY 
27% 38% 50% 51% 55% 61% 69% 72% 
In cases with no conviction recorded, the case resolution is documented 
as dismissed, diverted, or adjudication deferred. In San Antonio, 25% of mis-
demeanors have a deferred adjudication. In the other jurisdictions it is difficult 
to distinguish between dismissal, diversion, and deferred adjudication with the 
data available. Our interviews suggest that diversion and deferred adjudication 
are common in most jurisdictions. 
7. Racial Disparities 
Figure 6 shows the number of misdemeanor cases filed in 2013 per 1,000 
inhabitants, categorized by race and offense. Figure 7, which shows the black-
white ratio in the per-capita number of cases filed in 2013 by offense type, 
shows these disparities even more clearly. For most jurisdictions and most of-
fenses, there is a large racial discrepancy in the per-capita number of cases.  
The Chicago area had the most extreme racial disparities.121 The per-
capita misdemeanor case rate for black defendants in Chicago was about five 
times that of white defendants for violent, theft, and other offenses.122 For drug 
and public-order offenses, the per-capita case rate was about twelve times 
higher for blacks than whites.123 In contrast, Philadelphia had the lowest rates 
of racial disparities.124 The per-capita case-filing rate in Philadelphia was close 
to equal for black and white defendants across the various offense catego-
ries.125 In the other jurisdictions, for most of the other offenses, with the excep-
tion of DUIs, which exhibited relatively low racial disparities, the black-white 
per-capita case-filing ratio ranged from two to four.126 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, Staff Attorney, Boone Cty. Trial Office, Ky. Dep’t 
of Pub. Advocacy (Aug. 10, 2018). 
 121 CHI. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 85. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (providing datasets for all eight jurisdictions 
studied). 
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Figure 6: Cases Filed per 1,000 Inhabitants by Race and Offense 
 
Note: This graph shows the case-filing rates by misdemeanor-offense category and race. 
For example, the white case-filing rate for drug offenses is the annual number of drug cases in 
which the defendant is white per 1,000 white inhabitants.  
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Figure 7: Black-White Case-Filing Rate Ratio 
 
 Note: This graph shows the black-white ratio in misdemeanor case-filing rates by offense 
category. This is defined as the per capita case-filing rate for black defendants divided by the per 
capita case-filing rate for white defendants. For example, the black-white ratio in theft cases 
would be the theft case-filing rate for black defendants (the annual number of theft cases in 
which the defendant is black per 1,000 black inhabitants) divided by the theft case-filing rate for 
white defendants (the annual number of theft cases in which the defendant is white per 1,000 
white inhabitants). 
There was much less racial disparity in the conviction rates. Figure 8 
shows racial disparities in the likelihood of being convicted. There is no con-
sistent pattern. In several of the jurisdictions the conviction rate for black de-
fendants is higher. In others, the conviction rate is higher for white defendants. 
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Figure 8: Conviction Rates by Race 
 
Note: This graph shows the percentage of cases that result in a conviction by race. 
B. Bond and Pretrial Detention 
Virtually all misdemeanor cases in our datasets for the Chicago, Houston, 
San Antonio, and Philadelphia areas originated as an arrest by a police officer 
rather than a summons or citation.127 In Kentucky, however, about one third of 
cases originated with a summons or citation,128 and 42% and 50% originated 
with summons in Fairfax and in rural Virginia, respectively.129 This discrepan-
cy is partly explained by the kinds of offenses our datasets cover—that is, the 
kinds of non-traffic offenses adjudicated in the “main misdemeanor courts” in 
each jurisdiction. In Kentucky and Virginia, jurisdictions with relatively higher 
rates of cases originating with a summons or citation, our data include all state 
and municipal misdemeanors.130 A substantial proportion of municipal offenses 
are relatively less serious than the average state-law misdemeanor. In the other 
jurisdictions, the main misdemeanor court principally adjudicates state-law 
offenses that carry potential sentences of imprisonment. 
Among defendants arrested, booked, and brought to a bail hearing (the 
large majority of defendants in the Chicago, Houston, San Antonio, and Phila-
                                                                                                                           
 127 CHI. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 85; HOUS. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; PA DOCKET 
SHEETS, supra note 82; SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84.  
 128 KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83. 
 129 VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84. 
 130 KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83; VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84. 
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delphia areas and 50–66% of cases in Kentucky and Virginia), there is wide 
discrepancy in bond practices.131 Figure 9 shows bond amounts for arrested 
defendants in each of the eight jurisdictions. The fraction of defendants re-
leased without having to pay monetary bond ranges from essentially zero in 
San Antonio and Houston to near 60% in Fairfax, rural Virginia, Philadelphia, 
and the Chicago area.132 Most bonds are less than or equal to $5,000, although 
bonds at $25,000 and above are not unheard of in most jurisdictions. 
Figure 9: Bond Amounts 
 
Note: This graph shows the percentage of misdemeanor cases with bond set at different 
levels. The sample is limited to misdemeanor cases that result in an arrest and booking; cases in 
which the defendant is merely issued a summons are omitted from this analysis. 
Figure 10 shows the fraction of defendants who remain detained pretrial 
for at least three days at various levels of bond. Most defendants who remain 
detained for at least three days are detained until the case is resolved. Even at 
relatively low amounts of bond—$500—the fraction who remain detained is 
                                                                                                                           
 131 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (providing datasets for all eight jurisdictions 
studied). 
 132 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (same). 
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quite high, ranging from 20–50% in the jurisdictions for which these data are 
available. In general, the fraction detained increases as bond amounts go up. At 
$5,000, 53–78% of defendants remain detained. It is important to note that 
bond practices vary across these jurisdictions. In Philadelphia, defendants must 
only pay a 10% deposit to secure release.133 Thus, a defendant with a $5,000 
bond must only pay $500 to secure her release. In Houston, a defendant can 
borrow bail money from a bondsman.134 In Kentucky, bondsmen have been 
outlawed.135 This likely explains why the detention rates per bond amount are 
usually higher in Kentucky than in the other jurisdictions. 
Figure 10: Fraction of Defendants Detained Three Days or  
More at Various Bond Amounts 
 
Note: This graph shows the percentage of defendants who are detained for three days or 
more by bond amount. For example, about 47% of defendants in rural Kentucky with bond set at 
$500 are detained for three days or more. 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Telephone Interview with Alexa Van Brunt, supra note 111. 
 134 Cf. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 1704.001–.306 (West 2019) (providing regulations of bail bond 
sureties). 
 135 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510(1) (West 2019). 
2020] Misdemeanors by the Numbers 1011 
Figure 11 shows racial differences in the likelihood of posting a given 
bond amount. For each of the common bond amounts, we compare the fraction 
of white defendants with that bond who post bail with the fraction of black 
defendants with the same bond who post bail. The graph shows the difference 
between the fraction of white and black defendants who post at a given bond 
amount. Although racial disparities vary, the lines in the graph are often above 
zero, suggesting that white defendants are more likely to post bond than black 
defendants. This is particularly pronounced in San Antonio and, at higher bond 
amounts, in Philadelphia. Neither the Louisville area nor rural Kentucky ex-
hibits consistent evidence of racial disparities in bond-posting rates. The dif-
ference bounces around between positive and negative and generally remains 
close to zero. 
Figure 11: White-Black Differences in Bail-Posting Rate 
 
Note: This graph shows racial disparities in the likelihood of posting various amounts of 
bail. For example, if 60% of white defendants with bail set at $500 were able to post, but only 
40% of black defendants with $500 bail were able to post, there would be a 20-percentage-point 
difference in the bail-posting rate shown on the graph. 
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C. Sentencing 
The criminal justice consequences of a conviction vary hugely across ju-
risdictions. Figure 12 shows that in the San Antonio and Houston areas, re-
spectively, 65% and 80% of all convictions result in a jail sentence.136 In Vir-
ginia, a much smaller percentage of convictions (12–17%) result in a jail sen-
tence.137 The length of the jail sentence also varies, although they all tend to be 
relatively short. With a median of five days, Chicago has the shortest jail sen-
tences.138 Philadelphia and San Antonio have the longest jail sentences, with a 
median of thirty days.139 
Figure 12: Incarceration Rates and Lengths 
 
Note: The graph on the left shows the percentage of misdemeanor defendants sentenced to 
jail, and sentenced to jail if convicted, respectively. The graph on the right shows the median 
sentence, in days, for those who received a carceral sentence. 
 
Figure 13 shows that there is also considerable variation in the percentage 
of convicted defendants who are sentenced to probation. This data is only 
available for four jurisdictions. Fairfax and rural Virginia both place more than 
20% of convicted defendants on probation; San Antonio places 35% of con-
victed defendants on probation, and Houston only places about 15%. The me-
dian probation length is one year in all jurisdictions. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 136 HOUS. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84. 
 137 VA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84. 
 138 CHI. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 85. 
 139 PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84. 
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Figure 13: Probation Rates and Lengths 
 
Note: The graph on the left shows the percentage of misdemeanor defendants sentenced to 
probation, and the percentage sentenced to probation if convicted, respectively. The graph on the 
right shows the median probation length, in days, among those who were assigned to probation. 
Figure 14 shows that there is also considerable variation in the use of 
fines. Fines are relatively uncommon in Kentucky and Chicago, but ubiquitous 
and steep in the San Antonio area. 
Figure 14: Fines 
 
Note: The graph on the left shows the percentage of misdemeanor defendants who 
receive a fine, and the percentage of misdemeanor defendants who receive a fine if 
convicted, respectively. The graph on the right shows the median fine, in dollars, 
among defendants who received a fine. 
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Finally, Figure 15 shows that virtually all convicted defendants in the ju-
risdictions for which these data are available are required to pay court costs if 
convicted. The median court costs range from around $100 in Virginia to more 
than $500 in Philadelphia. 
Figure 15: Court Costs 
 
Note: The graph on the left shows the percentage of defendants who are charged court 
costs, and the percentage of defendants who are charged court costs if convicted, respectively. 
The graph on the right shows the median court cost, in dollars, for those who are charged court 
costs. 
III. WHAT THE NUMBERS REVEAL 
Several key takeaways emerge from the numbers. For the most part, they 
substantiate claims about misdemeanor justice that other scholars have made: the 
misdemeanor systems in these jurisdictions affect a tremendous number of peo-
ple, and they disproportionately affect people of color.140 The data also reveal 
both dramatic variation and structural similarly across misdemeanor systems. 
A. The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice (Again)141 
The first notable fact the data reveal is no surprise: the volume of misde-
meanor cases is very high. As noted above, if the 2013 data, averaged across 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 99 (discussing the profound imbalance within the crim-
inal justice system towards people of color). 
 141 See generally Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14. 
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jurisdictions, were representative of contemporary practice nationwide, there 
would be more than 13 million misdemeanor cases filed annually, or 40.4 per 
1,000 people. This estimate accords with our prior estimate on the basis of data 
collected from thirty-four states by the National Center for State Courts 
(NCSC)142 as well as with Professor Alexandra Natapoff’s national estimate 
for 2015.143 By the NCSC’s accounting, misdemeanor cases represent approx-
imately three-quarters of the criminal justice cases processed in the United 
States.144 
Affirming other estimates of national misdemeanor case-filing rates may 
seem like an incremental contribution. Nevertheless, given the dearth of empir-
ical information about misdemeanor justice, the consistency of these estimates 
is reassuring. Prior estimates—our own and others—relied on jurisdictions’ 
self-reporting of case-filing totals.145 It is not always clear how various juris-
dictions tally their misdemeanor cases or what data they use to do so.146 The 
fact that an extrapolation from individual records in eight jurisdictions comes 
out to approximately the same number suggests that the national estimates are 
on target.147 
The case-level records assessed here are also consistent with our prior 
finding that the misdemeanor system has been shrinking.148 Although the 
timespan of these data is limited, case-filing rates declined for each of the eight 
jurisdictions over the time they cover. These trends are consistent with national 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Id. at 745.  
 143 NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME, supra note 17, at 41, 258; Natapoff, Misdemean-
ors 2012, supra note 6, at 1320–21 (suggesting that a report estimating that there are 10.5 million non-
traffic misdemeanor cases per year is likely an underestimate). 
 144 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATEWIDE CRIMINAL CASELOAD COMPOSITION IN 31 
STATES 1 (2016), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/Criminal/PDFs/EWSC-
2016-CRIM-Page-2-Comp.ashx [https://perma.cc/Z7Z9-9DCX]. 
 145 See, e.g., Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 736–37 (explaining that the primary source 
of the misdemeanor data analyzed was “publishable” data from thirty-two states and Washington, 
D.C. as well as state court publications). 
 146 Moreover, the NCSC directs states to follow certain procedures that we did not in this analy-
sis. For instance, it instructs states to count all charges relating to a single incident for a defendant as a 
single case, not to classify a charge as a misdemeanor if the offense is punishable by incarceration for 
more than one year, and not to count “violations of local ordinances” as misdemeanors (even if they 
are designated as “misdemeanors” by local law). COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, STATE COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 14–22, 34–37 (2019), http://www.
courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/State%20Court%20Guide%20to%20Statistical%20
Reporting.ashx [https://perma.cc/V95S-ZZM4]. 
 147 Prior estimates were calculated by tabulating misdemeanor caseload in states that report such 
information to the NCSC, and inferring misdemeanor caseload for non-reporting states based on simi-
lar reporting states and/or information reported by state courts. NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT 
CRIME, supra note 17, at 258; Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 736–37. 
 148 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 764–69. 
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data.149 They are also consistent with the trends in misdemeanor arrest rates 
recently reported in California, New York, Seattle, St. Louis, Louisville, 
Durham, and Prince George’s County.150 
The ongoing decline in misdemeanor case-filing rates does stand in ten-
sion with the narrative of an expanding misdemeanor system that some recent 
misdemeanor scholarship has suggested.151 As we have discussed elsewhere, 
misdemeanor scholarship has been heavily influenced by empirical work in 
New York City, where the misdemeanor system experienced considerable 
growth in the 1990s and early 2000s.152 We hope that future scholarship will 
explore the causes of the declining caseloads and their implications for how we 
understand misdemeanor justice. 
B. Misdemeanor Injustice 
The data surveyed here also, unfortunately, affirm conventional wisdom 
about the effects of money bail and the disproportionate racial impact of misde-
meanor systems.153 The use of money bail resulted in pretrial detention for the 
majority of defendants even with bail set at relatively low amounts. At $500 bail, 
25% of Houston defendants and almost 50% of Philadelphia, Louisville, and 
rural Kentucky defendants remained jailed for three days or more.154 At $5,000 
bail, roughly 55% of Philadelphia and Houston defendants,155 68% of Louisville 
defendants,156 and almost 80% of rural Kentucky defendants remained in jail for 
at least three days.157 This is despite the fact that Philadelphia defendants need 
only have posted 10% of the bail amount to be released, and commercial bail 
                                                                                                                           
 149 See id. (reporting that the number of misdemeanor arrests and cases is declining nationwide). 
 150 See Jacob Gershman, Arrests for Low-Level Crimes Are Plummeting, and the Experts Are Flum-
moxed, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/arrests-for-low-level-crimes-are-
plummeting-and-the-experts-are-flummoxed-11570354201 [https://perma.cc/9MRG-SR5W] (discussing 
the falling rates of misdemeanor cases in New York, California, St. Louis, Durham, and Seattle); supra 
notes 25–26. 
 151 See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 620–21 (describing urban 
courts as “flooded . . . with low-level cases”); Roberts, supra note 9, at 281 (suggesting that “misde-
meanors are . . . on the rise”). 
 152 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 765; see also PATTEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 13 
(noting that “[f]rom 1980 to 2010, the rates of misdemeanor arrests in New York City surged from 
1,389 to 4,351 per 100,000, a 213 percent increase”). 
 153 See generally David Arnold et al., Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 1885, 1885 
(2018) (discussing and analyzing the racial biases towards black defendants in judges’ bail decisions 
and the resulting consequences). 
 154 HOUS. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83; PA DOCKET 
SHEETS, supra note 82. 
 155 HOUS. DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82; PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82. 
 156 KY DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 83.  
 157 Id. 
2020] Misdemeanors by the Numbers 1017 
bondsmen operate in Houston.158 The data suggest that even these low-end bail 
amounts are beyond the reach of many misdemeanor defendants, regardless of 
whether there is a deposit or commercial surety regime in place. 
The racial disparities in this data are equally stark. With a single excep-
tion (DUIs in the Houston area), the per-capita misdemeanor case-filing rate is 
higher for black people than for white people for every offense type, in every 
jurisdiction. For most offenses, the per-capita case-filing rate for blacks is two 
to four times that of whites. The result is that, relative to the general popula-
tion, black people are overrepresented among misdemeanor defendants in eve-
ry single jurisdiction. The disparities are least marked in Philadelphia. They 
are most pronounced in Chicago. 
We cannot say to what extent these disparities result from underlying dif-
ferences in rates of offending, and to what extent they result from underlying 
differences in rates of arrest and charging that are unrelated to differences in 
offending. Such differences in arrest or charging rates might arise from con-
centrated policing in minority neighborhoods,159 or from implicit or explicit 
racial bias. They also might depend on whether the suburban towns surround-
ing a major city—which often have higher white populations and less concen-
trated street-policing—are included in that city’s misdemeanor court data. 
Misdemeanor courts in the Chicago and Houston areas include the surrounding 
suburban towns; Philadelphia misdemeanor courts serve only Philadelphians. 
Disentangling the source of the disparities, however, would require a great deal 
more research. 
Finally, some jurisdictions also demonstrate significant racial disparities 
in the likelihood of pretrial detention (of at least three days) at a given mone-
tary amount. At bail amounts of $5,000 or less, black defendants are thirteen to 
eighteen percentage points more likely to remain in jail than white defendants 
in San Antonio.160 In Philadelphia, black defendants are five to seventeen per-
centage points more likely to remain detained at bail amounts of at least 
$5,000.161 As noted above, the fact that this pattern is found at higher bail 
amounts in Philadelphia may be due to the deposit system, which means that 
the functional bail amount in any case is 10% of that officially set. Interesting-
ly, there is no discernable pattern of racial disparity in the likelihood of posting 
bail in Kentucky. 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (discussing the bond systems in Philadelphia 
and Houston). 
 159 Cf. Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 635 (noting that “quality-of-life 
policing is intensely spatially concentrated in neighborhoods with high crime rates and high minority 
populations”). 
 160 SAN ANTONIO DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 84. 
 161 PA DOCKET SHEETS, supra note 82. 
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C. Uniformity Amid Variation 
There is a common perception among misdemeanor scholars that misde-
meanor systems are wildly heterogeneous,162 and, to some extent, the data 
bears that out. There was dramatic variation across jurisdictions on almost all 
of the dimensions we measured. To cite a few examples: The conviction rate 
ranged from a low of 27% in Chicago to a high of 72% in rural Kentucky. In 
Philadelphia, Chicago, and Kentucky, many cases involved multiple charges; 
in Virginia and Texas, cases involved only one charge. In Houston, more than a 
third of cases were resolved within two weeks; in Philadelphia and Virginia, 
less than 5% were. Pretrial release without financial conditions was common 
in six jurisdictions—indeed, a majority of defendants in Virginia, Philadelphia, 
and Chicago were released without bail—but next to nonexistent in the Texas 
counties. Relatively few convicted defendants were sentenced to jail in Phila-
delphia and Virginia (12–24%); in San Antonio and Houston, large majorities 
were (65% and 85%, respectively). Philadelphia’s median sentence—thirty 
days—was three or more times that of Kentucky, Fairfax, or Chicago. These 
differences in the data almost certainly reflect underlying differences at several 
levels: the substantive law defining misdemeanors and governing enforcement, 
the institutional arrangements for enforcement, the demographics of the juris-
diction, and local practice.163 This fact and its implications are discussed in 
more detail in Part IV.B. 
But despite the variation, the eight jurisdictions also had a set of deep 
structural features in common. As discussed above,164 several offense types 
were prevalent in all jurisdictions: possession of marijuana, simple assault (of-
ten domestic violence), petty larceny (often shoplifting), and DUI. Other 
common offenses included disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, prostitution, 
vandalism, trespass, public intoxication, underage drinking, and unlawful pos-
session of weapons, drug paraphernalia, or crime tools. Although these were 
not uniformly processed as misdemeanors in all jurisdictions (as opposed to 
summary offenses or municipal violations), they were common enough to be-
long at the core of any definition of misdemeanor criminal justice. Certain as-
pects of misdemeanor case processing were common as well. All jurisdictions 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See, e.g., Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 256 (stating that the misdemeanor 
justice system “is neither uniform nor consistent”). 
 163 In the Philadelphia data, for instance, the relative dearth of public-order cases, prevalence of 
drug cases, and high median sentence are due to the city’s classification of “misdemeanors,” which 
includes more serious crimes such as non-marijuana drug possession and some drug distribution of-
fenses. The fact that non-jailable traffic and municipal offenses are adjudicated alongside more serious 
misdemeanors in Kentucky and Virginia explains the fact that only slightly over half of misdemeanor 
defendants are represented. 
 164 See supra notes 99–119 and accompanying text. 
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used money bail as a condition of pretrial release for a large portion of defend-
ants. Virtually no cases went to jury trial. Defendants who were required to pay 
money bail often remained detained pretrial. Defendants who were convicted 
were required to pay court costs. And the misdemeanor case-filing rate for the 
four core misdemeanor offense categories fell in every jurisdiction over the 
years for which we have data. 
The moral of the story, we think, is that misdemeanor systems are both 
alike and unalike. It is never safe to extrapolate from one jurisdiction to anoth-
er. On the other hand, it is equally ill-advised to assume that every misde-
meanor system is entirely unique or that local practices wholly determine the 
shape of misdemeanor justice. 
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF HETEROGENEITY 
In addition to aggregate trends, detailed misdemeanor court data afford a 
closer look at the species of study itself—the misdemeanor offense. Section A 
of this Part considers what light the data shed on a question raised by other 
misdemeanor scholarship:165 To what extent are misdemeanor crimes wholly in 
the eye of the beholder (i.e. the police or the prosecutor)? Section B explores a 
second question raised by this research project:166 Is “misdemeanor” a useful 
category for scholarship at all? 
A. Schrödinger’s Crime? 
The reinvigoration of misdemeanor scholarship in the last few years has 
given rise to questions about the nature of misdemeanor offenses themselves. 
The uninitiated might assume that a misdemeanor is simply a less serious 
crime than a felony—a mini-felony, as it were. But scholars like Alexandra 
Natapoff, Jenny Roberts, Issa Kohler-Hausmann, and Eisha Jain have offered 
compelling evidence that misdemeanor law enforcement serves fundamentally 
different purposes than felony law enforcement. To radically simplify their 
work and do justice to none of it, each has argued, from a different angle, that 
the state deploys the machinery of misdemeanor criminal justice primarily to 
exercise social control over populations perceived as disorderly and dangerous 
rather than to impose deserved punishment for specific bad acts.167 They have 
                                                                                                                           
 165 See infra notes 167–188 and accompanying text. 
 166 See infra notes 189–199 and accompanying text. 
 167 See generally Jain, supra note 17, at 826–44 (noting the many ways in which arrests have 
become a tool to regulate rather than as a means to properly enforce the criminal justice system); 
Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 619–29 (arguing that by enforcing misde-
meanors under a “managerial model,” courts regulate populations rather than criminal acts); Alexan-
dra Natapoff, Criminal Misdemeanor Theory and Practice, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
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each made variations on Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon’s argument that 
the misdemeanor justice system has produced a “new penology” that empha-
sizes surveillance rather than punishment.168 
This literature is diverse, but one central theme is that misdemeanor law 
enforcement patterns do not reflect the underlying incidence of crime. Rather, 
arrest and prosecution patterns reflect police and prosecutors’ judgments about 
which individuals and populations are so disorderly or dangerous as to require 
the state’s coercive control.169 These judgments are always colored by race and 
class. Thus, misdemeanor enforcement disproportionately targets the poor and 
the disenfranchised, and especially poor people of color.170 Misdemeanor of-
fenses permit this kind of selective enforcement, because they are both trivial 
and amorphous. If people commit misdemeanors all the time (like traffic viola-
tions), or if anyone might be said to be committing a misdemeanor because of 
its ill-defined nature (like disorderly conduct), then the discretionary choices of 
police and prosecutors wholly determine which incidents are designated as 
“criminal.” Misdemeanors, on this view, are Schrödinger’s crime: Their exist-
ence is determined at the moment they are perceived. They are created by ar-
rest and prosecution.171 
                                                                                                                           
LAW (Markus Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2016), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.
1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935352-e-9 [https://perma.cc/WW8S-
FYSM] (arguing that misdemeanors are treated as a regulatory mechanism and are enforced with 
significant discretion when compared to “the requirements of culpability and due process that tradi-
tionally constrain criminal law”); Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 264 (arguing that 
“the misdemeanor system permits a regulatory social control agenda to proceed under the formal aegis 
of criminal law”). 
 168 See Feeley & Simon, supra note 6, at 449 (discussing the increasing focus on group manage-
ment and surveillance in the criminal justice system instead of punishing individual bad acts). 
 169 See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 643–44, 646 (suggesting 
that prosecutors use the criminal justice system to “sort and regulate the . . . people who flow through 
the courts” rather than for “determining guilt or innocence and imposing sanctions accordingly”); 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 263–64 (stating that “[p]opulation management, not 
guilt, is the primary concern, as police, prosecutors, and courts iteratively mark and keep tabs on pop-
ulations considered risky”). 
 170 See Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 262–63 (arguing that “[m]isdemeanors 
are . . . one of the concrete mechanisms through which the US criminal system engages in the group 
criminalization of disadvantaged populations”). 
 171 See, e.g., id. at 256 (describing misdemeanor justice as “dominated by police arrest practices and 
assembly-line processing”); Abdallah Fayyad, The Criminalization of Gentrifying Neighborhoods, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/the-criminalization-of-
gentrifying-neighborhoods/548837/ [https://perma.cc/4GTG-ZTBU] (suggesting that the number of 
misdemeanor arrests in a given area is a better indicator of the number of police officers on patrol in that 
area than the amount of crime committed). 
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Our prior work evaluating national-level data complicates that narra-
tive.172 If misdemeanor enforcement were driven by highly subjective police 
and prosecutorial decision making, one would expect enforcement patterns to 
vary with local conditions and culture. But the national data show some re-
markably consistent trends. Misdemeanor case-filing rates have been falling 
for at least a decade.173 Misdemeanor arrest rates have been falling for at least 
two decades in almost every likely-misdemeanor offense category.174 Arrest 
rates for our misdemeanor index have been falling in almost every state for 
which data are available.175 In fact, misdemeanor arrest trends look not unlike 
broader crime trends.176 These patterns suggest that, at least to some extent, mis-
demeanor justice is shaped by factors exogenous to any particular jurisdiction. 
The data evaluated in this Article add further complexity. On the one 
hand, misdemeanors that look like mini-felonies—assault/battery, theft, and 
DUI—make up a substantial proportion (26–55%) of the cases in our analy-
sis,177 as they do in the national-level data.178 These offenses seem relatively 
objective in the scheme of things. There are blood-alcohol thresholds for 
DUI.179 Theft generally involves physical property and a complaining wit-
ness.180 Battery usually involves physical contact.181 A charge for any one is 
typically based on something other than a police officer’s unsubstantiated tes-
                                                                                                                           
 172 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 14, at 744–63 (presenting the results of a study of national 
misdemeanor case-filing rates and arrest rates for offenses that are likely to be classified as misde-
meanors). 
 173 Id. at 765. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 771. 
 176 See Tim Lau, Crime Rates in Largest U.S. Cities Continue to Drop, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
(June 12, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/crime-rates-largest-us-
cities-continue-drop [https://perma.cc/8DKP-W5FM] (reporting that the crime rates in the largest 
cities in the United States continued to decline in 2018, including rates of violent crime and murder). 
 177 Again, if one excludes non-DUI traffic offenses. 
 178 We do not consider marijuana possession a mini-felony because it is widely considered non-
culpable, is increasingly legal, and is subject to considerable discretion in arrest and prosecution. See 
German Lopez, 15 States Have Decriminalized—But Not Legalized—Marijuana, VOX (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/20/17938358/marijuana-legalization-decriminalization-states-
map [https://perma.cc/5HKD-APMD] (noting that marijuana is legal in eleven states as well as Wash-
ington, D.C. and has been decriminalized in fifteen states). 
 179 See BAC Legal Limits in Different States, Counties, & Cities, ALCOHOL.ORG, https://www.
alcohol.org/dui/bac-limits/ [https://perma.cc/VY3C-K6HE] (last updated Dec. 18, 2019) (listing the 
legal alcohol limits for each state in the United States). 
 180 See Theft, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7 (defining theft as the “wrongful taking 
and removing of another’s personal property with the intent of depriving the true owner of it”). 
 181 See Battery, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7 (defining battery as “any unlawful 
beating, or other wrongful physical violence or constraint, inflicted on a human being without his 
consent”). 
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timony. These common misdemeanor offenses are not prototypical Schröding-
er’s crimes. 
To say that these offenses are relatively objective does not mean they are 
wholly objective, though, and it is extremely difficult to know to what extent 
they are enforced disproportionately against poor people or people of color. As 
always, the problem is that we cannot see underlying offense rates. In the data 
studied here, DUI case-filing rates were more or less equivalent across racial 
groups in all eight jurisdictions. That might mean that DUI enforcement accu-
rately reflects DUI offending. Alternatively, it might be that white people 
commit DUI at higher rates, but the laws are enforced disproportionately 
against black people. Or vice versa. Similarly, as noted above, the racial dis-
parities in case-filing rates for theft and violent misdemeanor offenses could 
reflect either disparities in underlying offense rates or racial distortion in en-
forcement.182 Professor Babe Howell has documented how arrests for certain 
theft offenses, like shoplifting, and certain violent offenses, like harassment, 
increased in New York City on days when police deployed additional pa-
trols.183 She hypothesizes that when more police officers are on patrol, shop-
lifters are more likely to be arrested and harassment and contempt of court 
complaints are more likely to be pursued.184 The category of “theft” also in-
cludes theft-of-services charges like fare evasion, or turnstile jumping, which 
was a major target for zero-tolerance policing in New York City185—and pos-
sibly elsewhere. In sum, the prevalence of “mini-felony” offenses in all eight 
misdemeanor systems is a counterweight to the Schrödinger’s-crime narrative, 
but it is hardly determinative. 
On the other hand, the data also included sizable numbers of marijuana 
possession and public-order cases, including disorderly conduct, resisting ar-
rest, and trespass. These have more potential as Schrodinger’s crimes. And in-
deed, national data suggest that drug possession laws are enforced dispropor-
tionately against black people relative to rates of offending, at least on a na-
                                                                                                                           
 182 It might be possible to compare case-filing rates for theft and simple assault against rates of 
offending inferred from crime victimization surveys, like the National Crime Victimization Survey. 
See Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey, BUREAU JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 [https://perma.cc/T7HR-Q2Y6] (reporting on 
statistical data taken from interviews with the victims of criminal acts). 
 183 K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-
Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 288–89 (2009). 
 184 See id. at 289 (“On days when more police officers are on regular duty, discretion will more 
likely be exercised in favor of arresting shoplifters. Police may follow up on complaints for contempt 
of court or harassment.”). 
 185 See id. at 288 (noting that approximately 11% of arrests on a busy day in New York City were 
for turnstile jumping); Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 17, at 631–33 (describing 
New York City Mayor Giuliani’s strict approach towards low-level crime, which included “vigorous 
enforcement of minor prohibitions, such as turnstile jumping”). 
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tional scale.186 Although non-DUI traffic offenses are not included in most of 
the analysis here, they also may be subject to substantial discrepancy in en-
forcement. Perhaps it is these offense types that most directly facilitate the se-
lective enforcement that contemporary scholars describe. 
If drug and public-order offense types lend themselves to race- and class-
skewed policing, we might expect to see greater racial disparity in case-filing 
rates for these offenses than for others.187 The Chicago data support this hy-
pothesis. In Chicago, the case-filing rates for drug and public-order offenses 
were more than twelve times higher for black people than for white, whereas 
they were a mere five-to-six times higher for theft and violent offenses. Else-
where, though, the data do not comply. With the exception of DUIs, which uni-
formly had lower rates of racial disparity, there is no consistent relationship in 
the data between offense type and degree of racial disparity.188 
Overall, the data assessed here suggest that the Schrödinger’s crime narra-
tive is more likely to be true of some offense categories than others, in some 
places more than others. Though these data alone do not provide any clear an-
swers, they do offer a starting point for further research. 
B. The Study of “Misdemeanor” Justice 
Any quantitative study begins with the simple question of what data to 
evaluate. In this study, the question was not so simple. We set out to study 
“misdemeanors.” But “misdemeanor” is an ill-defined category. It maps only 
loosely onto a particular set of behaviors. Some actions—possession of mari-
juana, for instance—might be categorized as a felony in one jurisdiction, a 
misdemeanor in another, a summary offense or civil violation in a third, and a 
legal activity in a fourth.189 For researchers and policymakers interested in un-
                                                                                                                           
 186 See Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 298–300 (2015) (report-
ing on the higher arrest rates of people of color for drug crimes compared with white individuals). 
 187 At least if any racial disparities in underlying offending rates were constant across offense 
types. 
 188 Because the categories used in this Article are fairly broad, there may be more consistent ra-
cial disparity patterns in more narrowly defined offense categories. See, e.g., Stevenson & Mayson, 
supra note 14, at 763–71 (reporting on racial disparities in arrest rates for specific offenses including 
but not limited to gambling, prostitution, and drunkenness).  
 189 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3405 (2019) (stating that possession or use of marijua-
na is a “class 6 felony”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1422 (West 2019) (stating that possession of 
marijuana is a Class B misdemeanor); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601.1 (West 2019) (stating 
that possession or use of under ten grams of marijuana “is not a criminal conviction for any purpose”); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.06 (West 2019) (permitting the charging officer to issue a 
summons rather than make an arrest for possession of four ounces or less of marijuana).  
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derstanding low-level criminal justice, the question of what to include in the 
“misdemeanor” bucket is challenging on both practical and conceptual levels.190 
A first possibility is to include only those offenses explicitly classified as 
misdemeanors by the laws of a particular jurisdiction—that is, to think of 
“misdemeanor” as a legal designation. But this definition is both thin and im-
practical. It is thin, because a legal designation has little meaning beyond its 
real-world consequences. And the real-world consequences of the legal desig-
nation “misdemeanor” vary dramatically both across and within jurisdictions. 
For example, the maximum carceral sentence for a misdemeanor conviction is 
five years in Pennsylvania, but only one year in Illinois.191 Within a jurisdic-
tion, both state and municipal law can contain offenses labeled as misdemean-
ors, and such offenses might be adjudicated in any one of multiple courts: a 
state criminal court, municipal court, a dedicated traffic court, and so forth.192 
The experience of being arrested and prosecuted for a misdemeanor varies 
tremendously depending on local practices and the procedures of the particular 
court in which one lands. Some misdemeanors, particularly minor traffic and 
regulatory offenses, are typically processed in much the same way as speeding 
tickets.193 A court appearance may not be mandatory, pretrial detention is rare, 
and jail sentences are not authorized.194 Other misdemeanors are processed 
more like felony criminal cases, and most fall somewhere in between. Another 
way of putting the point is that limiting study to those offenses designated as 
“misdemeanors” achieves clear but somewhat meaningless boundaries, be-
cause the term is broad and different jurisdictions use it differently.195 
For purposes of empirical study, defining “misdemeanor” as a legal des-
ignation is also impractical. Records for the many different courts within each 
jurisdiction are often collected and stored in separate data systems. Identifying 
and obtaining records from all of the different data sources within a particular 
system that handle charges legally designated as misdemeanors would be ex-
tremely challenging.196 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See, e.g., Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 255–57 (describing the challenges 
in studying the U.S. misdemeanor system, including its inconsistency and nonuniformity). 
 191 Compare 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-55 (West 2019) (stating that the maximum term 
of imprisonment for a Class A misdemeanor is one year), with 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 106 (West 2019) (stating that the maximum term of imprisonment for a misdemeanor is five years). 
 192 See supra Table 2. 
 193 In twenty-five states, speeding is a misdemeanor. NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME, 
supra note 17, at 45. 
 194 Cf. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1077–89 
(2015) (discussing the range of forms that a decriminalized misdemeanor or infraction can take). 
 195 See Natapoff, Misdemeanors 2015, supra note 17, at 256–57 (noting the definitional chaos in 
low-level criminal law). 
 196 It might also seem appealing to try to collect comprehensive data on court cases by offense 
type (“traffic,” “public-order,” “violent,” etc.), ignoring the legal offense-class designation and the 
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If the goal is to understand how low-level criminal-case processing oper-
ates on the ground, a more conceptually satisfying approach might be to define 
a category for study on the basis of what actually matters to the individuals 
accused: the practical effects of a given charge. Researchers might attempt to 
delineate a class of proceedings to analyze on the basis of criteria like the like-
lihood of arrest, likelihood of pretrial detention, onerousness of contesting the 
charge, maximum authorized penalties, likely penalty, likelihood of a jail sen-
tence, likelihood of future incarceration for failure to comply with court-
imposed conditions, collateral consequences triggered by conviction, and de-
gree of stigma associated with the charge. But this approach is not workable. 
To assess, say, the collateral consequences of conviction for a single offense in 
a single jurisdiction is challenging; to delineate a cross-jurisdictional class of 
offenses with comparable “practical effects” would be near impossible. And it 
might also require collecting data from disparate data sources within each ju-
risdiction. 
We therefore arrive at our own approach: focusing on non-traffic misde-
meanors tried in state court. This is partly a practical solution to a difficult data 
problem. It was simply beyond our capacity to obtain comprehensive data 
from all of the other low-level courts that handle some offenses designated as 
misdemeanors. But this class of cases also constitutes a defensible category in 
and of itself. It appears to us that most offenses designated as misdemeanors, 
in most jurisdictions, are tried in state court. And within state-court misde-
meanor systems, traffic offenses appear to constitute the single greatest source 
of variation across jurisdictions. Once they are excluded, the residual misde-
meanor caseloads exhibit some uniformity and allow for much more meaning-
ful cross-jurisdictional comparison. 
The difficulty of deciding what class of cases to analyze in order to un-
derstand the realities of low-level criminal-case processing, however, high-
lights a deeper question: is “misdemeanor” a useful category for scholarship at 
all? In our view the answer is a qualified yes. “Misdemeanor” criminal jus-
tice—whether it is understood to encompass all cases legally designated as 
such or some related set, as here—has enough coherence, and is important 
enough, to warrant all the attention it has begun to receive and more.197 But 
                                                                                                                           
forum in which cases are adjudicated. But, for the same reasons, this approach is also both thin and 
impractical; each offense “type” suffers from the same degree of variation and ambiguity as the cate-
gory of “misdemeanor” itself. How to delineate the boundaries of a category like “traffic,” “public-
order,” or “violent offense” is a highly subjective question, as is the question of which specific offens-
es meet whatever definition one settles on. Within each offense type, different offenses may be han-
dled differently. And this approach would also require collecting data (for each offense type) across 
fragmented data systems. 
 197 See supra notes 9 and 17 and accompanying text (noting various scholars who have recently 
studied U.S. misdemeanor law and its consequences). 
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researchers should understand that “misdemeanors” include a wide array of 
both state and municipal offenses that may be subject to adjudication in multi-
ple courts, and that the contents of this array vary from place to place. Con-
versely, “misdemeanors” may exclude municipal offenses that have equivalent 
practical effects. Given the tremendous overlap and porous boundaries be-
tween state misdemeanor law, municipal law, and traffic law (both state and 
municipal), any empirical study of misdemeanor enforcement should delineate 
its unit of analysis as carefully as possible. And to truly understand low-level 
law enforcement, we must ultimately study all of these systems in conjunction. 
The second thing that misdemeanor researchers should bear in mind is 
that different low-level offense types may serve different functions and have 
essentially different characters, and that the fault lines do not necessarily align 
with legal or institutional divides. Charlie Gerstein and J.J. Prescott argue, for 
instance, that “public order” offenses serve primarily as vehicles to justify the 
arrests and short-term detentions that police find necessary to maintain the 
peace.198 Once the immediate threat has dissipated, conviction and punishment 
are irrelevant. Offenses like theft, on the other hand, are more like codifica-
tions of traditional crimes—culpable and harmful acts—for which the punish-
ment is the point, either because it is deserved or because the threat of punish-
ment serves as a deterrent. To the extent that this is true, offenses that serve the 
public-order role might be codified in state or municipal law, classified as mis-
demeanors or violations, and adjudicated in any number of possible courts, 
depending on the place. As empirical analysis of misdemeanor justice gets un-
derway, researchers should be alert to these functional differences. It may be 
that we should strive to identify and analyze functional categories, rather than 
the miscellaneous body of offenses held together by a word on a statute page. 
The even deeper normative question is what function misdemeanors 
should serve. It seems safe to say that the fuzziness of the category derives, at 
least in part, from a lack of societal clarity on this point. If the purpose of the 
misdemeanor classification is to designate lesser crimes—acts less serious than 
felonies, but still deserving of the particular condemnation and stigma that a 
criminal conviction carries—then it should include only acts that are widely 
viewed as morally culpable.199 Stretching the notion of a misdemeanor offense 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 268, 276–77 (2015), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/vol128_Gerstein
Prescott.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZW4-YCSD] (arguing that “[w]ith rare exceptions, once the very low-
level defendant is arrested, the police have accomplished their immediate goal of maintaining order” 
and are indifferent to conviction and punishment). 
 199 See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
401, 404 (1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment of commu-
nity condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”). 
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to contain both domestic assault and walking a dog without a leash creates ten-
sion. In response, criminal justice systems develop release valves that allow 
some offenses to be processed in less “criminal” fashion. The uneven evolution 
of this process across jurisdictions might help to explain the varied and frag-
mented grab bag of lower-level criminal court procedure. Whether “misde-
meanor” is a legal and conceptual category that could have coherence, and 
what a system of misdemeanor adjudication might look like if it did, are ques-
tions for future debate. 
CONCLUSION 
The empirical study of misdemeanor criminal justice presents difficult 
challenges, but they are not insurmountable. This overview study offers evi-
dence that in many respects affirms conventional wisdom about the operation 
of misdemeanor systems, but in other respects calls them into question. In 
highlighting variance across jurisdictions, it also raises interesting questions. 
Why, for instance, are racial disparities so extreme in Chicago relative to Phil-
adelphia? What accounts for the wide range in conviction rates from one juris-
diction to the next? Questions like these will require sustained and localized 
investigation. We hope to have provided useful fodder for that work. 
1028 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:971 
APPENDIX A: EIGHT MISDEMEANOR SYSTEMS—DETAILS AND SOURCES 
Houston and San Antonio, Texas 
Misdemeanor Classification Scheme 
● Class A—punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment and/or fine of 
$4,000.200 
● Class B—punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment and/or fine of 
$2,000.201 
● Class C—punishable by fine up to $500,202 and conviction “does not im-
pose any legal disability or disadvantage.”203 Some state-law offenses and all mu-
nicipal offenses are Class C misdemeanors.204 
Municipal vs. State Law 
● Counties and municipalities can and do enact ordinances or regulations 
that create criminal offenses called “misdemeanors,” but they may not carry a sen-
tence of incarceration.205 
● The Texas Penal Code prohibits counties and municipalities from criminal-
izing any conduct already covered by the penal code,206 but in practice they often 
do; the prohibition seems to have been interpreted simply to require that any such 
offense carry precisely the same penalty as under state law.207 Houston’s Munici-
pal Code, for instance, just stipulates, “no penalty shall be greater or less than the 
penalty provided for the same or a similar offense under the laws of the state.”208 
● Any municipal or county offense that carries a potential fine over $500 
must include a mens rea element (a “culpable mental state”).209 
                                                                                                                           
 200 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.21 (West 2019). 
 201 Id. § 12.22. 
 202 Id. § 12.23. 
 203 Id. § 12.03. 
 204 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 54.001 (West 2019); Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, 
supra note 64. 
 205 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 54.001; Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra 
note 109. 
 206 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.08 (West 2019). 
 207 See, e.g., Letter Opinion from Rick Gilpin, Deputy Chair, Op. Comm., Office of the Attorney 
Gen., Tex., to Representative René O. Oliveira, Chair, Comm. on Econ. Dev., LO98-041 (May 11, 
1998) (“Penalties under ordinances, if the ordinance is the same as the state law, must conform strictly 
to penalties prescribed by the state law. Such penalties cannot exceed or fall below the penalties pre-
scribed by the state law; that is, where the ordinance pertains to the same matter as that enacted by the 
Legislature.”) (quoting Ex parte Goldburg, 200 S.W. 386, 387–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918)). 
 208 HOUS., TEX., CODE § 1-6 (2020); see also, e.g., id. § 28-22 (providing that duplicative offens-
es in that chapter shall be punished “as provided in state law”).  
 209 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (West 2019). 
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● Counties can imprison individuals for non-payment of fine—receive credit 
of $100 per day—although in theory this requires a determination of willful fail-
ure.210 
● In Harris County, both Houston and Pasadena have municipal codes.211 
Institutional Structure 
● State courts (called County Courts at Law) adjudicate Class A and B mis-
demeanors, while county-run justice-of-the-piece courts and municipal courts ad-
judicate Class C misdemeanors.212 
● Most traffic offenses are Class C misdemeanors. This means that most traf-
fic offenses, although they are state-law offenses, are handled in the JP and munic-
ipal courts.213 
● But DUIs and some others are Class A or B misdemeanors.214 
● Occasionally a Class C misdemeanor will be adjudicated in the County 
Courts, but Class A and B misdemeanors are never adjudicated in the justice-of-
the-piece or municipal courts.215 
Summons vs. Arrest 
● All Class C misdemeanor prosecutions can be initiated by summons rather 
than arrest as well as some Class A and B misdemeanors (possession of 4 oz. or 
                                                                                                                           
 210 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.09-10 (West 2019) (permitting discharge of fine through 
incarceration or work); id. art. 43.091 (“A court may waive payment of all or part of a fine imposed on 
a defendant if the court determines that . . . the defendant is indigent or does not have sufficient re-
sources or income to pay all or part of the fine . . . .”); id. art. 45.203 (West 2019) (permitting munici-
pal courts to jail individuals for non-payment of fine); see also HOUS., TEX., CODE § 16-51 (2020) 
(“No person may be imprisoned because he cannot pay the full amount of the fine owed. If the de-
fendant fails to pay an installment or refuses to pay the fine assessed, he shall be incarcerated until the 
fine is fully satisfied.”); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE § 1-6 (2020) (“In all cases where a fine is im-
posed by or in the municipal court, in default of immediate payment thereof, the defendant shall be 
imprisoned in jail, or required to work in the streets or other public works in the city, under the direc-
tion of the police, until the fine is paid, allowing fifteen dollars ($15.00) per day until the sum 
amounts to that of the fine . . . .”). 
 211 HOUS., TEX., CODE, https://www.houstontx.gov/codes/ [https://perma.cc/HW4V-WJ83]; PA-
SADENA, TEX., CODE, https://www.cityofpasadena.net/city-services/municipal-code/ [https://perma.
cc/4ZNR-ESAM]. 
 212 Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, supra note 64; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 27.031 (West 2019) (defining the jurisdiction of justice courts); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 29.003 
(West 2019) (defining the jurisdiction of municipal courts). County sheriffs bring cases to justice-of-
the-peace courts, whereas municipal police bring cases to municipal courts, but the offenses handled 
in each court are the same. Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109. 
 213 Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109. 
 214 E.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 504.9465 (West 2019) (sale or negligent possession of a 
license plate flipper are Class A and B misdemeanors, respectively); id. § 550.024 (West 2019) (viola-
tion of duty to take responsibility for striking unattended vehicle can be Class B misdemeanor). 
 215 A Class C misdemeanor might wind up in the County Courts if the DA elects to downgrade a 
Class A or B arrest charge, or if it arises from the same incident as Class A or B charges and thus is 
filed concomitantly. Justice-of-the-peace and municipal courts, conversely, lack jurisdiction to hear 
Class A and B cases. Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109. 
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less of marijuana or synthetic marijuana, graffiti, petty theft, contraband in a cor-
rectional facility and driving with an invalid license).216 
● There do not appear to be any offenses for which a summons, rather than 
arrest, is mandatory. 
● For eligible Class A and B misdemeanors, the DA usually makes the deci-
sion as to whether to cite and release.217 The law itself suggests that the decision is 
within law enforcement’s discretion,218 but as a practical matter it is necessary for 
both the DA and the court to agree to a citation (in order to give the person a court 
date), and the DA tends to be the deciding vote. 
● Class C cases are generally initiated by ticket. People do sometimes get ar-
rested, however, if they have an outstanding warrant for a previous failure-to-
appear or unpaid fine.219 
Pretrial Custody 
● Texas is a “right-to-bail” state—the Texas Constitution includes a right to 
bail for non-capital defendants.220 
● Bail bondsmen are prevalent.221 
Pretrial Process 
● Texas law requires the DA to file an “information” to formally initiate 
prosecution in Class A and B cases.222 This may not always happen in practice.223 
● Detained misdemeanor defendants must be tried within thirty days for a 
Class A charge, within fifteen days for a Class B charge, and within five days for a 
Class C charge.224 If the information has not been filed and the state is not ready 
by the deadline, the defendant must be released.225 
Houston (Harris County) 
                                                                                                                           
 216 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.06 (West 2019). 
 217 Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109. 
 218 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.06(b)–(c). 
 219 Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109. 
 220 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.07 (West 2019); see also TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West 2019) (articulating considerations for bail-setting); TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.03 (West 2019) (providing for personal bonds in lieu of bail). 
 221 Cf. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1704. et seq. (West 2019) (providing regulations for bail bonds-
men). 
 222 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 17; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.04 (West 2019); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.01 (West 2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.018; 23 TEX. JURIS-
PRUDENCE 3D Criminal Procedure: Pretrial Proceedings §§ 567, 634, Westlaw (database updated 
Jan. 2020); 4A TEX. JURISPRUDENCE Pleading & Practice Forms § 84:74, Westlaw (2d ed., database 
updated Nov. 2019). 
 223 Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109. 
 224 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.151 (West 2019). 
 225 Id. 
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● There are sixteen County Courts at Law that hear Class A and B misde-
meanor cases.226 
● The DA prosecutes all classes of misdemeanors. 
● A central administrative office handles calendaring for all misdemeanors, 
which means that, relative to other counties (like Bexar), case scheduling is rela-
tively efficient and consistent across the sixteen courts.227 
● In the County Courts at Law, each charge is filed and treated as an inde-
pendent “case”; a person who is arrested on multiple charges will have multiple 
cases, and each charge/case is generally adjudicated separately.228 
● Houston had a bail schedule for misdemeanor offenses during the period 
our data covers. 
● People charged with Class A and/or B charges, if they have sufficient 
funds, can be released from the police station. A person who cannot immediately 
post bail as provided for on the schedule will appear in front of a magistrate within 
twenty-four hours. This includes anyone arrested on a Class C charge, although 
Class C cases are handled on a separate docket. 
● An ADA is always on call to make charging decisions. Arresting officers 
promptly call the DA’s office to report an arrest, and an ADA determines whether 
or not to “take” the charges. The DA staffs this role twenty-four hours a day.229 
● The efficiency of charging in Harris County facilitates defendants’ quick 
release because almost immediately after arrest each defendant (for whom the DA 
accepts charges) has both formal charges and a case number. 
● Between 2011–2016, no defense representation for the indigent was pro-
vided at bail hearings. 
● With respect to adjudication, there is no right to counsel for Class C mis-
demeanors and virtually everyone proceeds pro se. For Class A and B misdemean-
ors, between 2011–2016, the Public Defender represented only those with severe 
mental illness, a very limited set. All other indigent defendants were appointed 
counsel from a rotating wheel.230 
● As of 2016, the DA offers diversion for first-time possession of marijua-
na.231 
                                                                                                                           
 226 See HARRIS COUNTY COURTS, http://www.ccl.hctx.net/ [https://perma.cc/DP9K-R3KB] (list-
ing courts in Harris County). 
 227 Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Telephone Interview with Alex Bunin, supra note 64. 
 230 Id. 
 231 See Danny Clemens, Everything You Need to Know About Harris Co.’s New Pot Policy, ABC 
13 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Mar. 2, 2017), https://abc13.com/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-harris-
cos-pot-policy/1757801 [https://perma.cc/W6TV-M8NN] (reporting that the new Misdemeanor Mari-
juana Diversion Program “will divert all misdemeanor marijuana cases . . . instead redirecting low-
level drug offenders into a decision-making class”). 
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San Antonio (Bexar County) 
● There are fifteen County Courts at Law that hear Class A and B misde-
meanor cases as well as specialized court programs (including DWI Court, Veter-
ans Treatment Court, Mental Health Court, and Adult Drug Court).232 
● San Antonio has an extensive municipal code that includes many offens-
es.233 
● San Antonio police reportedly do not ever issue summons for misdemean-
or charges.234 
● There is no ADA on call to accept/reject arrest charges. This can result in 
long delays in the filing of formal charges.235 
● As in Houston, each charge is filed and treated as an independent case.236 
● Magistrates make probable-cause determinations as well as bail. 
● Before 2014, the Public Defender only handled mental-health cases, but 
the office has since expanded.237 
● For indigent cases beyond the Public Defender’s capacity, private attor-
neys are appointed from a wheel.238 
● Each County Court handles its own calendar, so there is reportedly quite a 
bit of variation in case timing across the fifteen courts.239 
● Diversion functions much like deferred adjudication: the Court takes a 
guilty plea but sets sentencing out a year and, if the defendant complies with all 
conditions imposed, the plea is never entered. Approximately 25% of all San An-
tonio misdemeanor cases are reportedly channeled into diversion.240 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
Misdemeanor Classification Scheme 
● First degree—punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment and/or fine of 
$10,000.241 
● Second degree—punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment and/or fine 
of $5,000.242 
                                                                                                                           
 232 Telephone Interview with Judge Stolhandske and Amy Castano, supra note 109; see also BEXAR 
COUNTY COURTS, https://www.bexar.org/1055/County-Courts [https://perma.cc/WQT2-NL5C] (listing 
courts in Bexar County). 
 233 E.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE §§ 7-10, 26-20 (2020) (stating the penalties for violations of 
the provisions relating to cemeteries and air pollution). 
 234 Telephone Interview with Judge Stolhandske and Amy Castano, supra note 109. 
 235 Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109. 
 236 Telephone Interview with Judge Stolhandske and Amy Castano, supra note 109. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Telephone Interview with Susanne Pringle, supra note 109. 
 240 Telephone Interview with Judge Stolhandske and Amy Castano, supra note 109. 
 241 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 106(b)(6), 1101(4) (West 2019). 
 242 Id. §§ 106(b)(7), 1101(5). 
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● Third degree—punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment and/or fine of 
$2,500.243 
● Summary offense—punishable by up to ninety days’ imprisonment and/or 
fine up to $300.244 
● Note: Misdemeanors are more serious than in other jurisdictions and more 
low-level offenses are codified as summary offenses. Far fewer traffic offenses are 
codified as state-law misdemeanors than other jurisdictions (only thirty-six, as 
opposed to more than one hundred in Texas, Illinois, and Virginia), and none in the 
Penal Code. 
Municipal vs. State Law 
● Cities “of the first class,” of which Philadelphia is the only one, can create 
criminal offenses punishable by up to $2,300 and/or ninety days’ imprisonment.245 
● Philadelphia’s Municipal Code (the Philadelphia Code) includes offenses 
designated “summary offenses,”246 “misdemeanors,”247 and “violations,”248 but 
these variations in terminology do not seem to carry any particular legal meaning. 
● The Philadelphia Code also includes three classes of violations: Class I 
(maximum fine is $300), Class II (maximum fine is $1,000), and Class III (maxi-
mum fine is $2,000).249 
● It appears that the Philadelphia Code includes some forty offenses that are 
punishable by imprisonment,250 and that the maximum possible penalty for any 
Code offense is ninety days’ imprisonment and a fine of $2,000.251 
Institutional Structure 
● State misdemeanors and jailable traffic offenses are handled in Municipal 
Court (in the Criminal Justice Center) on a daily basis.252 
                                                                                                                           
 243 Id. §§ 106(b)(8), 1101(6). 
 244 Id. §§ 106(c), 1101(7) (West 2019). 
 245 8 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3321 (West 2019) (authorizing boroughs to prescribe 
fines and penalties); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (West 2019) (defining a first class 
city as one whose population is one million people or greater); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13131 (authorizing cities of the first class). 
 246 E.g., PHILA., PA., CODE, § 10-1105 (2020) (stating that violators of Philadelphia’s obscenity 
provisions are “guilty of a summary offense”). 
 247 E.g., id. § 10-115 (stating that a violation of Philadelphia’s dog and cat sterilization provisions 
is a Class III offense). 
 248 E.g., id. §§ 4A-501, 4A-601 (stating provisions governing city violations and their ensuing 
penalties). 
 249 Id. § 1-109. 
 250 See id. §§ 3-103, 6-103, 6-400, 6-600, 9-105, 9-200, 9-400, 9-600, 9-900, 9-1000, 9-1100, 9-
1600, 9-2100, 9-3200, 9-3500, 10-109, 10-115, 10-200, 10-300, 10-500, 10-600, 10-800, 10-900, 10-
1100, 10-1500, 10-2200, 12-800, 12-900, 12-1100, 12-2400, 12-2600, 12-2900, 13-300, 18-200, 19-
1800, 19-2600, 19-2800, 21-1000.  
 251 Id. § 1-109; e.g., id. § 6-103 (subjecting violators of the city’s health code to imprisonment for 
a maximum of ninety days). 
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● The same court has special days for non-jailable traffic and summary of-
fenses.253 
Summons vs. Arrest 
● Pennsylvania law directs police to issue a summons for any 2nd/3rd degree 
misdemeanor or 1st degree DUI unless there is reason to believe that the person 
will not appear or poses a threat.254 
● Interviews suggest that Philadelphia practice does not reflect this statutory 
mandate. Interviewees report that the Philadelphia police do not arrest for ordi-
nance violations; they instead issue tickets or “code violation notices.”255 But Phil-
adelphia police reportedly do arrest for nearly all misdemeanors except first pos-
session of marijuana.256 
Pretrial Custody 
● Magistrates may set bail,257 though there is no state-constitutional right to 
bail, and bail can be denied if “no condition or combination of conditions other 
than imprisonment will reasonably assure the safety of any person and the com-
munity when the proof is evident or presumption great.”258 
● Philadelphia operates a “deposit” program: Defendants can obtain release 
by posting 10% of the total bail amount with the court, most of which is recovera-
ble at the conclusion of the case if the accused appears for court.259 This deposit 
program has limited the role of bail bondsmen, although defendants may still seek 
a loan from a bond agent if they are unable to procure the full deposit amount. 
Pretrial Process 
● Upon arrest, Philadelphia police take the arrestee to the police holding cell, 
where he or she is fingerprinted. The police write a preliminary arrest report 
                                                                                                                           
 252 Telephone Interview with Mira Baylson, supra note 72; see also PA. R. CRIM. P. § 1001 (de-
fining “Municipal Court case”). 
 253 Telephone Interview with Mira Baylson, supra note 72. Prior to 2016, a separate Traffic Court 
adjudicated non-jailable traffic offenses, but that court has been dissolved and replaced by the Munic-
ipal Court Traffic Division. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 102, 325, 1121, 1127, 1302, 
1321 (West 2019) (establishing scheme for hearing traffic cases in Philadelphia); S.B. 334, 2013–
2014 Reg. Sess., P.L. 55, No. 17 (Pa. 2013) (creating the Traffic Court of Philadelphia). 
 254 PA. R. CRIM. P. §§ 509, 519, 1003(C) (West 2019). 
 255 See, e.g., Permits, Violations & Licenses, CITY OF PHILA., https://beta.phila.gov/services/
permits-violations-licenses [https://perma.cc/WXM4-HUZ3] (providing information on different per-
mits, violations, and licenses available in the city of Philadelphia). 
 256 Telephone Interview with Sarah Allen, supra note 110; Telephone Interview with Mira Bayl-
son, supra note 72. 
 257 PA. R. CRIM. P. § 523 (West 2019) (bail-setting criteria); id. § 528 (West 2019) (directing 
court to consider release criteria in Rule 523 and ability to pay). 
 258 PA. CONST. art. I, § 14; see also PA. R. CRIM. P. §§ 520, 521 (West 2019) (procedures for 
ordering detention). 
 259 PA. R. CRIM. P. § 528. 
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(PARS), which is sent to the DA’s office. The DA determines which formal charg-
es, if any, to file.260 
● Arraignment is generally held within eighteen hours of arrest. The PARS is 
provided to defense counsel. Interviewees report that the formal charges ultimately 
filed will frequently differ from the PARS charges.261 
Adjudication 
● Philadelphia misdemeanor defendants may waive their right to a jury trial 
in favor of an expedited bench trial, which many do. The dominant form of bench 
trial is a “negotiated stipulated trial.” This is really a modified guilty plea.262 The 
remaining defendants in the waiver program have a more standard bench trial. 
Such trials typically take less than an hour and involve only a few witnesses (po-
lice officers in drug cases, complainants in assault cases, and loss-prevention of-
ficers in theft cases).263 A defendant who is convicted retains the right to a de novo 
jury trial, but few defendants pursue this option, because sentences imposed after a 
jury trial are thought to be considerably harsher than those imposed by the waiver 
judges. 
● Philadelphia operates a broad array of formal misdemeanor diversion pro-
grams, including programs for nonviolent first-time offenders, for repeat offenders 
with underlying addiction or mental health problems, for veterans and for people 
charged with first-offense DUI.264 Since 2011, the system has funneled approxi-
mately 20% of all misdemeanor arrests into one of these diversion programs (the 
Accelerated Misdemeanor Program, or AMP).265 
● Deferred adjudication is also a possible disposition, at the DA’s discretion. 
This involves a no-contest plea that is held in abatement until the person com-
pletes, or fails to complete, the conditions imposed.266 
                                                                                                                           
 260 Telephone Interview with Sarah Allen, supra note 110. 
 261 Id. 
 262 The defendant does not admit guilt, but the outcome of the trial is negotiated in advance. The 
DA either moves the police report into evidence or reads minimal facts into the record. The judge then 
determines that the defendant is guilty. Usually the sentence is negotiated in advance, but sometimes it 
is left open and the parties make sentencing arguments to the judge. 
 263 “Protracted” trials that involve multiple witnesses or interpreters are held in a special protract-
ed-trial room. 
 264 See generally DEREK RIKER, PHILA. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION PRO-
GRAMS (undated and unpublished) (on file with authors); Telephone Interview with Derek Riker, 
supra note 110. 
 265 This program, which began in 2011, is for nonviolent first-time offenders. A defendant can 
avoid conviction by completing the program requirements, which takes approximately five weeks. A 
newer program, AMP2, targets people who cycle through the system because of underlying drug ad-
diction or mental health issues. This program is more customized than AMP1 and takes several 
months to complete. It involves intensive conditions and social services support. 
 266 Telephone Interview with Sarah Allen, supra note 110. 
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● In 2014, Philadelphia revised its city code to define possession of less than 
thirty grams of marijuana as a summary civil offense punishable by a fine of twen-
ty-five dollars.267 Marijuana arrests have plummeted since.268 
● In 2017, a former civil rights attorney, Larry Krasner, was elected as DA 
on a reform platform. Among other reform commitments, he has avowed to “end[] 
cash bail” in Philadelphia.269 
Chicago, Illinois 
Misdemeanor Classification Scheme 
● Class A—punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment and/or a $2,500 fi-
ne.270 
● Class B—punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment and/or a $1,500 
fine.271 
● Class C—punishable by up to thirty days’ imprisonment and/or a $1,500 
fine.272 
● All misdemeanors can be probated for a maximum of two years.273 
● Petty offenses—punishable by up to 6 months of probation or conditions 
pursuant to conditional discharge and/or a fine of $1,000.274 
● Business offenses—Punishable by a fine, conditional discharge, or super-
vision as specified by individual offense statutes.275 
Municipal vs. State Law 
● Municipalities can criminalize the same conduct as the state but may not 
enact ordinances that are preempted by state regulation or that “infringe upon the 
spirit of the state law or are repugnant to the general policy of the state.”276 
                                                                                                                           
 267 PHILA., PA., CODE § 10-2102 (2020); Relaxed Marijuana Law in Effect in Philly, NBC PHILA. 
(Oct. 19, 2014), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/relaxed-marijuana-law-in-effect-in-
philly-monday/83496/ [https://perma.cc/FMT3-S7S6]. 
 268 Anna Orso, Marijuana Arrests Down 75 Percent Since Philly Decriminalized, BILLYPENN 
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://billypenn.com/2017/10/24/marijuana-arrests-down-75-percent-since-philly-
decriminalized/ [https://perma.cc/GYH6-9WZA]; Telephone Interview with Derek Riker, supra note 
110. But see Sam Wood et al., Despite Marijuana’s Increasing Legalization and Acceptance, Arrests 
Soar, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/weed-marijuana-
legalization-arrests-pennsylvania-new-jersey-african-american-20181004.html-2 [https://perma.cc/
L63E-B42B] (observing a contrasting trend of increased marijuana possession arrests in Philadelphia 
suburbs). 
 269 See Ben Austen, In Philadelphia, a Progressive D.A. Tests the Power—and Learns the Limits—
of His Office, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/magazine/larry-
krasner-philadelphia-district-attorney-progressive.html [https://perma.cc/B2E5-6XC5] (noting that 
during his campaign for DA, Larry Krasner supported eliminating cash bail, decriminalizing low-level 
offenses, and monitoring “police and prosecutorial misconduct”). 
 270 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-55 (West 2019). 
 271 Id. 5/5-4.5-60. 
 272 Id. 5/5-4.5-65. 
 273 Id. 5/5-4.5-65, -60, -65.  
 274 Id. 5/5-4.5-75. 
 275 Id. 5/5-4.5-80. 
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● Municipalities can impose misdemeanor penalties of up to six months’ in-
carceration and a fine of up to $750.277 
● Chicago’s Municipal Code appears to have fifty-two of these offenses, in-
cluding failure to appear at a hearing,278 impersonating a fireman,279 drug offens-
es,280 public nuisance,281 gang loitering,282 and abandonment of refrigerators.283 
Summons vs. Arrest 
● Police may issue a summons rather than arrest for any misdemeanor.284 
Pretrial Custody 
● The Illinois Constitution provides for preventive pretrial detention of capi-
tal defendants, defendants facing life sentences, and felony defendants facing a 
mandatory prison sentence if the court, after a hearing, determines that release 
“would pose a real and present threat to the physical safety of any person.”285 
● Other defendants are bailable. 
● The issuance of bail is governed by the Illinois Supreme Court Rules.286 
Cook County 
● The Circuit Court of Cook County is comprised of six districts—Chicago 
(First District) and five suburban districts.287 
● State-law misdemeanors 
                                                                                                                           
 276 Vill. of Northfield v. BP Am., Inc., 933 N.E.2d 413, 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); see Pesticide 
Pub. Policy Found. v. Vill. of Wauconda, 510 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Ill. 1987) (when “the legislature en-
acts a comprehensive scheme of regulation, the legislature implies by the scheme that there is no room 
for additional regulation by local government units”). In determining whether local law conflicts with 
pre-established state law, the courts look to legislative intent. 
 277 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-2-1.1 (West 2009). 
 278 CHI., ILL., CODE § 1-4-145(b) (2019). 
 279 Id. § 2-36-840. 
 280 E.g., id. §§ 7-24-091, -092, -093, -094, -098. 
 281 Id. § 7-28-060 (stating that violators of the public nuisance provision “shall be subject to a 
penalty of not less than $200.00 nor more than $500.00, or imprisonment not to exceed 10 days, or 
both such fine and imprisonment for each offense”). 
 282 Id. § 8-4-015(e-f) (stating that violators of the gang loitering provision “[are] subject to a fine 
of not less than $100.00 and not more than $500.00 for each offense, or imprisonment for not more 
than six months for each offense, or both. A second or subsequent offense shall be punishable by a 
mandatory minimum sentence of not less than five days imprisonment. . . . Any person who violates 
an order issued by a court under this subsection (f) shall be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence 
of not less than five days imprisonment but not more than six months imprisonment”). 
 283 Id. § 7-28-040. 
 284 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/107-11, -12 (West 2019); see also Illinois v. Fitzpatrick, 986 
N.E.2d 1163, 1168–69 (Ill. 2013) (clarifying that the police may, but are not required, to issue a sum-
mons rather than an arrest). 
 285 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; 725 Ill. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/110-6.1(c)(1)(A) (procedures for pre-
ventive detention). 
 286 See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 501–590; see also Illinois Supreme Court Issues Substantial Rule Chang-
es, supra note 74.  
 287 Organization of the Circuit Court, CIR. COURT OF COOK CTY., http://www.cookcountycourt.
org/ABOUTTHECOURT/OrganizationoftheCircuitCourt.aspx [https://perma.cc/N2VJ-SQ2J]. 
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o Handled in a series of courts in the First District: Traffic offenses (in-
cluding DUI and driving on a suspended or revoked license, which 
carry a potential jail sentence) are handled in the Dailey Center if the 
defendant is in custody and in the Criminal Court (Layton Building) 
if the defendant is not. Domestic violence cases are handled in court 
at 555 West Harrison Street. Other misdemeanors are handled in five 
“Branch courtrooms” (Cook County courtrooms are hosted in police 
department buildings). 
o The DA prosecutes all state-law misdemeanors. 
o The DA offers diversion for first-time possession of marijuana. 
o The Public Defender represents indigent defendants charged with 
Class A, B, and C misdemeanors, which constitute the vast majority 
of defendants. 
● Municipal misdemeanors 
o Labeled as “ordinance violations” and include conduct such as im-
proper lane usage and littering. Most are punishable by fine only. 
o Municipal traffic offenses are handled in the “minor traffic rooms” at 
the Dailey Center. Other municipal offenses are handled in the 
Branch courtrooms. 
o Corporation Council (the City Attorney) prosecutes municipal of-
fenses. 
o Defendants are typically unrepresented, because there is no right to 
representation, but the Public Defender will represent a defendant if 
her charge is related to a higher-level case. 
o The city has transferred many of the municipal cases to an adminis-
trative hearing process outside of criminal court.288 
● Cook County provides indigent defense representation at bail hearings. 
● Most misdemeanor defendants are released on I-bonds (ROR). In some 
cases, magistrates impose D-bonds (deposit bonds) that require the defendant to 
pay a 10% deposit to be released, or “full bonds” that must be paid in full.289 
● Possible dispositions 
o Conviction 
o Acquittal 
o “Supervision” (deferred adjudication): The defendant proffers a 
guilty plea, but sentencing is set for some time in the future. If the 
defendant complies with all conditions of supervision, it is “terminat-
                                                                                                                           
 288 Telephone Interview with Mike Morrissey, supra note 64. 
 289 Telephone Interview with Alexa Van Brunt, supra note 111. 
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ed satisfactorily” and no conviction is ever entered. If not, the guilty 
plea is entered and the defendant is sentenced.290 
o  “Conditional discharge” (conviction unaccompanied by either jail or 
probation). 
o “Stricken off with leave to reinstate” (dismissal). 
● The city of Chicago and state of Illinois have enacted marijuana decrimi-
nalization measures that have reduced rates of marijuana arrests over the last few 
years.291 
Kentucky 
Misdemeanor Classification Scheme 
● Class A—punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment and/or fine of $500 
(for individuals), or $10,000 (corporations). 
● Class B—punishable by up to ninety days’ imprisonment and/or fine of 
$250 (for individuals), or $5,000 (corporations). 
● Violations—punishable by a $250 fine.292 
● Fines are mandatory, except for indigent persons or for offenses defined 
outside the penal code that specifically prohibit levying fines.293 
Municipal vs. State Law 
● Kentucky permits counties and municipalities to create municipal offenses, 
either misdemeanors or violations, which must be punishable according to the 
same scheme as in state law.294 
● Municipal offenses that are duplicative of state-law offenses must carry the 
same penalty as under state law.295 
● The Louisville Municipal Code appears to include at least nine offenses 
punishable by incarceration, but these are rarely prosecuted.296 
Institutional Structure 
● District Court has jurisdiction over both state-law and municipal misde-
meanors.297 
● County attorney prosecutes both (all criminal offenses).298 
                                                                                                                           
 290 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-70, -75. 
 291 Frank Main, Marijuana Arrests in Chicago Plummet, but Blacks Are ‘Vast Majority’ of Cases, 
CHI. SUN TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/cannabis/marijuana-arrests-enforcement-
chicago-police-declines-possession-blacks-african-americans-most-often-charged-ticketed-cannabis-
weed-watchdogs/ [https://perma.cc/8G2Y-MK26] (discussing the decrease in marijuana-related arrests as 
a result of the decriminalization of marijuana). 
 292 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.090 (West 2019), 534.040 (West 2019). 
 293 Id. § 534.040. 
 294 Id. § 83A.065(2) (West 2019). 
 295 Id. § 83A.065(5). 
 296 See LOUISVILLLE, KY., CODE Tit. XIII (listing general offenses); Telephone Interview with 
Melanie Foote, supra note 112. 
 297 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24A.110 (West 2019), 83A.065. 
 298 Id. § 83A.065. 
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● Statewide public defender agency (the Kentucky Department of Public 
Advocacy) provides indigent defense representation.299 
Summons vs. Arrest 
● Kentucky law directs police to issue citations rather than arrest for any 
misdemeanor, so long as there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
being cited will appear to answer the charge.300 
Pretrial Custody 
● Kentucky is a right-to-bail state. Its constitution provides that prisoners 
have the right to bail unless there is sufficient evidence or presumption of a capital 
offense.301 
● Kentucky abolished for-profit bail bonding in 1976.302 
● Arrestees are taken to the jail, where they are interviewed by the pretrial 
release agency. Pretrial Release relays its recommendation to an on-call judge, 
who sets bond. If the bond is ROR or unsecured, the person is released from jail 
with a date to return to court. If the judge sets cash bail, which can be partially 
secured (usually at 10% of the full amount) or required to be paid in full, then that 
amount must be paid at the courthouse or jail (if the jail in question accepts cash 
bail payments) for the person to be released. People who do not post bond are de-
tained until arraignment, usually held within twenty-four hours of arrest, where a 
detainee can ask for a lawyer and a lower bond.303 
● The Public Defender does its best to provide defense representation at ar-
raignment.304 
● The maximum cash bail amount for misdemeanors is $500.305 
● Kentucky’s Pretrial Release agency uses a risk assessment tool to assess 
the likelihood that an arrestee will fail to appear or be rearrested if released pend-
ing trial.306 
                                                                                                                           
 299 Who We Are, DEP’T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, KY.GOV, https://dpa.ky.gov/who_we_are/Pages/
default.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z34B-6FTQ]. 
 300 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015 (West 2019). 
 301 KY. CONST. § 16. 
 302 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510(1); see also Stephens v. Bonding Ass’n of Ky., 538 S.W.2d 
580, 581, 584 (Ky. 1976) (confirming that the Kentucky legislature’s abolishment of commercial bail 
bonding in 1976 is constitutional). 
 303 Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, supra note 112; Telephone Interview with Jacob 
Johnson, supra note 120. 
 304 Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, supra note 120. 
 305 Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, supra note 112. 
 306 See Thanithia Billings, Note, Private Interest, Public Sphere: Eliminating the Use of Commer-
cial Bail Bondsmen in the Criminal Justice System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1337, 1356–57 (2016) (noting 
that Kentucky courts use a pretrial program to determine defendants’ eligibility for bond by looking at 
“factors such as: flight risk, likelihood of the defendant to appear in court, and likelihood to be a dan-
ger to others”). 
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● Kentucky Supreme Court Order 2016-10 implemented the “Non-Financial 
Uniform Schedule of Bail Administrative Release Program” statewide. The order 
requires District Courts to release, via ROR, nearly all those arrested on non-
violent, non-sexual, non-DUI misdemeanors who score as low-risk on the risk as-
sessment scale.307 
Adjudication 
● All misdemeanors—state-law offenses and municipal offenses, traffic and 
non-traffic—are handled in District Court, along with many other kinds of cases 
(including disability hearings, juvenile status offenses, and child custody and sup-
port hearings). Many traffic offenses are misdemeanors; they carry potential jail 
sentences and thus the right to defense representation. Most traffic cases are 
scheduled on special “traffic dockets.”308 
● The County Attorney prosecutes all cases in District Court.309 
● Prosecutors do not typically make an independent charging decision at the 
start of the case. Cases are initiated on the basis of arrest charges.310 
● A public defender should be appointed for the indigent for any offense 
where the person is at “risk of loss of liberty” (which includes the risk of being 
held in contempt of court).311 
● The proportion of cases handled by the Public Defender varies by county. 
In Harden County, the Public Defender handles approximately 90% of the docket, 
but in other counties it may be less.312 
● Non-guilt dispositions313 
o Acquittal 
o Dismissal (sometimes “dismissed/merged” if only some charges are 
dismissed as part of a plea deal) 
o Dismissal on conditions 
o Deferred prosecution, also called “in-court diversion” or “in-court 
mediation” (if the defendant abides by the conditions imposed for the 
stipulated time period, the case is dismissed) 
                                                                                                                           
 307 Authorization for the Non-Financial Uniform Schedule of Bail Administrative Release Pro-
gram, No. 2016-10, (Ky.), https://kycourts.gov/courts/supreme/Rules_Procedures/201610.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QN2R-UR5Y]; see also Scott B. West, The Next Step in Pretrial Release Is Here: The Ad-
ministrative Release Program, THE ADVOC., (Pub. Defs. Prot. & Advocacy, Frankfort, Ky.), Jan. 
2017, at 1, https://dpa.ky.gov/Public_Defender_Resources/The%20Advocate/Advocate%20News
letter%20Jan%202017%20(COLOR%20-%20FINAL).pdf [https://perma.cc/47EY-DFL2] (discussing 
the Non-Financial Administrative Release Program). 
 308 Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, supra note 112. 
 309 Id.; Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, supra note 120. 
 310 Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, supra note 120. 
 311 Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, supra note 112. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id.; Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, supra note 120. 
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o Diversion (like deferred prosecution, but requires a plea of guilty 
without any sentencing) 
● A typical misdemeanor sentence will include some jail time with credit for 
time served, the remainder suspended, and two years of probation (the maximum 
allowable period of probation for a misdemeanor).314 
● In Boone County, prosecutors are often willing to amend charges down, or 
allow a person charged with multiple offenses to plead to the least serious charge 
only. Prosecutors are less willing to agree to either type of plea in Grant County. 
People do not plead to non-criminal violations.315 
● Diversion is commonly offered to first-time offenders charged with non-
violent, non-DUI offenses.316 
Virginia 
Misdemeanor Classification Scheme 
● Class 1—punishable by up to one year of imprisonment and/or fine of 
$2,500. 
● Class 2—punishable by up to six months of imprisonment and/or fine of 
$1,000. 
● Class 3—punishable by fine up to $500. 
● Class 4—punishable by fine up to $250.317 
● “Traffic infractions are violations of public order as defined in § 46.2-100 
and not deemed to be criminal in nature.”318 
Institutional Structure 
● Circuit courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanors.319 
o Each charge is docketed as a separate case.320 
● District courts have jurisdiction over ordinance violations and “[a]ll other 
misdemeanors and traffic infractions arising in such county . . . .”321 
● The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond has jurisdiction over “cases of 
offenses committed in Capitol Square . . . .”322 
Municipal vs. State Law 
● Municipalities can independently criminalize and prosecute the same con-
duct that constitute state misdemeanors, but penalties cannot exceed state-law pen-
                                                                                                                           
 314 Telephone Interview with Melanie Foote, supra note 112. 
 315 Telephone Interview with Jacob Johnson, supra note 120. 
 316 Id. 
 317 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11 (2019). 
 318 Id. §§ 18.2-8; 46.2-100 (2019) (providing motor-vehicle-related definitions). 
 319 Id. §§ 16.1-126; 17.1-513 (2019). 
 320 Telephone Interview with Nicole Galioto, supra note 109. 
 321 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-123.1. 
 322 Id. § 18.2-124. Capitol Square is an area consisting of “monuments, memorials, and buildings” 
surrounding the Virginia State Capitol. Capitol Square—VA, CULTURAL LANDSCAPE FOUND., 
https://tclf.org/landscapes/capitol-square [https://perma.cc/V2A6-WR27]. 
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alties for “like” offenses (and cannot exceed the penalties for a Class 1 misde-
meanor).323 
● For instance, under the Fairfax County Municipal Code, Class 1 and Class 
2 misdemeanors are punishable as under state law, by jail time, and/or a fine.324 
Summons vs. Arrest 
● Any misdemeanor is eligible for citation rather than arrest.325 
● Virginia law directs law enforcement officers to cite rather than arrest for 
all Class 3 and 4 misdemeanors and for some Class 1 and 2 offenses if certain 
conditions are met.326 
Pretrial Custody 
● The Virginia Constitution prohibits excessive bail, but does not explicitly 
either affirm or disclaim a right to bail.327 
● Statutory law and Supreme Court rules govern pretrial custody determina-
tions.328 
Adjudication 
● Defendants charged with jailable offenses may opt out of representation by 
accepting a deferred adjudication early in the case.329 
● Deferred adjudication requires the defendant to avoid arrest for six 
months. For some offenses there are additional conditions; deferred adjudication 
for possession of marijuana, for instance, entails a mandatory six-month suspen-
sion of the defendant’s driver’s license. If a defendant avoids arrest and complies 
with any other condition imposed, the charge is dismissed. 
                                                                                                                           
 323 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1429 (2019). 
 324 FAIRFAX CTY., VA., CODE § 1-1-14 (2020). 
 325 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-73 (2019). 
 326 Id. § 19.2-74. 
 327 VA. CONST. art. 1, § 9. 
 328 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-119–152.7 (providing bail and recognizances provisions); VA. 
SUP. CT. R. 5A:2 (providing rules for pre- and post-trial bail orders). 
 329 Telephone Interview with Nicole Galioto, supra note 109 (reporting that “a lot of times” peo-
ple charged with first-time possession of marijuana take this path). 
1044 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:971 
APPENDIX B: OFFENSE GROUPINGS 
The following chart enumerates the specific offense categories we includ-
ed in each of the seven main misdemeanor offense classes that we use as the 
basis of our analysis.330 
Drugs 
● Drug distribution offenses 
● Possession of controlled substances, 
drug paraphernalia 
DUI 
● Driving-while-intoxicated 
Public-Order 
● Begging/panhandling 
● Disorderly conduct 
● Lewdness 
● Loitering offenses 
● Mob action 
● Noise offenses 
● Obstructing justice 
● Obstruction of public ways 
● Offenses related to substance use 
(excluding DUI and licensing offenses; in-
cluding public intoxication) 
● Prostitution 
● Resisting arrest 
● Riding bicycle on sidewalk 
● Trespass 
Theft 
● Burglary offenses 
● Embezzlement offenses 
● Fraud offenses (including providing 
false identification or making a false report) 
● Possession or receipt of stolen prop-
erty 
● Theft-of-property offenses 
● Theft-of-services offenses (including 
fare evasion) 
Traffic 
● Driving on a revoked or suspended 
license 
● No insurance 
● Reckless driving 
● Speeding 
● Violation of equipment requirements 
● Violation of other traffic rules 
Violent 
● Assault offenses 
● Battery offenses 
● Endangerment offenses 
● False imprisonment 
● Manslaughter (Philadelphia only; 
classified as a felony elsewhere) 
● Threat offenses 
● Violation of a protective order 
Other 
● Failure to provide identification 
● Gang contact 
● Gambling offenses 
● Harassment 
● Hit-and-run offenses 
● Interference with emergency calls or 
services 
● Littering 
● Offenses related to the administration 
of justice (i.e. failure to appear in court, viola-
tion of bail bond condition, contempt of court, 
hindering prosecution) 
● Offenses related to animals 
● Offenses related to minors 
● Possession of burglary tools or 
“criminal instruments” 
● Property damage offenses (including 
graffiti and “criminal mischief”) 
● Regulatory offenses (an extremely 
varied category) 
● Sex-related offenses (not including 
prostitution or public urination) 
● Undecipherable offenses 
● Weapons offenses (unlawful posses-
sion or carrying) 
 
                                                                                                                           
 330 For more details on our offense-grouping methodology, see supra notes 86–87 and accompa-
nying text. 
